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A b s t r a c t
This paper seeks to explore the root factors which prevent Egyptian Christians, 
commonly know as Copts, from successfully participating in the country’s mainstream 
political system. The state of Copts in Egypt warrants significant attention, yet most 
reports consider their under-represented status to stem from discrimination from the 
country’s majority Muslim community. While that dynamic is present in varying 
degrees, it does not explain the Coptic Orthodox Church’s unwavering support for the 
ruling party and President Hosni Mubarak. Not only did the Church endorse the 
President during the recent 2005 elections, it has also carried out censures of secular 
Coptic activists who push for reform.
This study contends that the failure of Copts to be properly represented in 
government is not due to simple discrimination, but is linked to the same phenomenon 
which constrains any pluralism within Egyptian politics. The Coptic Church, instead of 
pressuring for political reform, has entered into a patron-client relationship with the state. 
This relationship sees that the President supports policies which are religiously 
significant for the Church in return for a commitment from the clergy to continually 
instruct its congregation to support the ruling party. The problem of Coptic political 
participation is therefore little different than that of any other political group within the 
Egyptian state. Co-operation with the ruling party politically is necessary in order to 
carry out activities without constraint. For the Coptic Church, this entails a great deal of 
autonomy in the conduct of religious affairs in return for granting the ruling party 
autonomy within the political sphere.
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C h a p t e r  o n e : I n t r o d u c t i o n  A n d  M e t h o d o l o g y
The Coptic Orthodox Church has its roots in St. Mark’s legendary proselytizing 
journey to Egypt in the first century A.D. Since then, Egypt has had a turbulent history, 
with various authorities vying for control of a country which was strategically important 
both in its location and the resources it contained. After the fall of Byzantine authority in 
the country in 641 A.D., Egyptian Christians gradually became the minority of the 
population and faced varying levels of tolerance from different rulers over the centuries.1 
Under the British rule for example, Copts were politically marginalized in an attempt to 
assure Muslims that the protectorate was not a Christian occupation. Still, during the 19th 
Century, the Copts had been allowed to participate as accountants and tax collectors, a 
role which saw the creation of a wealthy Christian elite.2 Later, during the pre­
revolutionary period, Christian communities organized rallies and conferences dedicated 
towards increasing their place in the bureaucracy and challenging laws which 
undermined their rights.3 Joining with Muslim nationalist groups, the Copts represented 
an extremely active political force within the Egyptian parliament, especially within the 
Egyptian Wafd party.4
Gamal Abdul Nasser’s revolution would change every element of Egyptian 
politics. Undermining the power of Egypt’s entire upper class through initiatives like the 
1952 re-distribution of land and the nationalizing of foreign business, power shifted
1 P.J. Vatikiotis, The History o f Egypt 2nd ed., (Baltimore: John Hopkins University, 1980), 14.
2 S.S. Hasan, Copts vs. Muslims in Egypt: A Century’s Long Fight for Equality (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), 33.
3 Otto F.A. Meinardus, Two Thousand Years o f Coptic Christianity (Cairo: The American University of 
Cairo University Press, 1999), 75.
4 Hasan, 40.
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quickly into a centralized state apparatus.5 The Christian upper classes were no longer 
effective in achieving political participation in the new authoritarian structure and in 
many cases, emigrated from the country. The middle class, much closer to the Coptic 
clergy, assumed increasing power and helped the Church create an autonomous religious 
sphere outside the mainstream Egyptian political environment.6 Much of this renewal of 
clerical hegemony revolved around new social programs which sought to ensure that
• • 7Copts became progressively more engaged with the Church.
During the presidency of Anwar Sadat, relations between the Coptic clergy and 
the ruling party were increasingly strained. Both authorities routinely challenged the 
other throughout the 1970s, with Sadat accusing the Coptic Patriarch, Shenuda III of 
trying to set up its own state.8 Coptic Christians were equally critical, some referring to 
the President as “Satan’s ally”.9 In the end, Sadat moved to arrest over 150 members of 
the clergy, including the Coptic Patriarch himself in an attempt to undermine what he saw 
as a potential challenge to his system of control.10
Upon his release by President Hosni Mubarak however, Pope Shenuda had moved 
to stress a message of reconciliation with the state.11 A new position of unqualified 
support for the ruling party would now accompany a continued and less obstructed 
commitment to programs of religious revitalization which the Church pursued so 
controversially before.
5 Vatikiotis, 392-393.
6 Hasan, 58.
7 Ibid., 3.
8 Ibid., 10.
9 Ibid., 6.
10 Meinardus, 85. The details o f the Pope’s imprisonment will be discussed in depth later in this study.
11 Ibid., 85.
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It is the belief of this study that the transition by Pope Shenuda and the Coptic 
clergy represented the construction of a clientelist relationship between the Church and 
state. The ruling party, under President Mubarak, allows the Church to have unparallel 
religious authority in return for their political support. The following chapters will detail 
the dynamics of this relationship, with focus being placed on the system of controls the 
government uses to restrict political space within Egypt, as well as the environment of 
vulnerability it maintains to coerce the Church into remaining its client. Moreover, 
attention will also be placed on the Church itself, and how it maintains control over the 
Coptic community and secular political groups who seek to challenge the status quo. 
Finally, this study will examine the specifics of the exchange between the ruling party 
and the Church, outlining what each provides the other within the system.
Understanding this relationship is important for several reasons. First, it 
contributes to an understanding of the root causes of political stagnation in the Middle 
East in general, a topic which has attracted a great deal of scholastic attention. Second, it 
provides a nuanced and detailed description of Coptic political attitudes and the clientelist 
environment within the Egyptian state. This is significant, because the welfare of the 
Coptic Christian community within Egypt is a growing policy concern within the 
American, Canadian and EU member governments, pressured both by Christian action 
groups and the Coptic Diaspora. Oversimplification of the relationship between Coptic 
Christians and the ruling party represents a serious concern, as it may be a foundation for 
poor policy initiatives. Contributions to this literature are greatly needed to mend a 
severe deficiency that exists within understandings of the political activities of the Coptic
3
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Church so that more effective steps may be taken to increase Christian participation in 
Egyptian politics.
Reflections on Literature
The unique nature of a case study can be problematic when determining a relevant 
body of literature to examine. In many ways, a specific case may be open to influence 
from a wide range of phenomenon, all of which must be taken into account to fully 
appreciate its dimensions. That said, the specific nature of a case study may cause only 
part of a body of literature to be relevant to the topic at hand. Moreover, since this study 
in particular proposes to build up a knowledge base which is in its infancy, few directly 
applicable examinations on this specific topic currently exist. Therefore, when dealing 
with an area that contains a distinct research deficiency, a complimentary examination of 
multiple streams of research is essential in order to produce a comprehensive fusion of 
knowledge on a topic. For the purposes of this paper, three streams of literature will be 
examined, including works dealing with good governance in the Arab region, Islamism 
and the Coptic Christian Church and community. For each of these topics, multiple 
themes and approaches exist and will be explored in order to underline many of the 
theoretical assumptions which will be discussed in the next chapter, as well as factors 
which affect the relationship between the Coptic Church and state.
Good Governance in the Arab Region
The root cause of the Arab region’s failure to achieve standards of good 
governance is a source of deep ideological and scholarly divide. For the purposes of
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
simplicity, the debate will be generalized within this study to two broad groups, described
10here as the “essentialist” and “structuralist” schools.
The essentialist school, as its name implies, sets out to describe a series of fixed
cultural and religious traits which are alleged to politically significant and inherent to the
region. These arguments are based on what Robert K. Kaufman (1974) describes as
11“cultural irrationality”, which stem from the innate, static characteristics of a society. 
Despite its controversial premise, the theory remains at the heart of concepts of Middle 
East “exceptionalism” which continue to be used to explain the failure of democracy to 
spread into Arab and Muslim countries. In the opinion of most essentialist scholars, 
Islamic religious and Arabic social values are at the heart of the region’s pervasive 
inability to achieve standards of good governance. What the West considers to be norms 
of pluralist political systems therefore will not form organically in this environment.
Perhaps the most famous work expounding this theory is Samuel P. Huntington’s 
The Clash o f Civilizations and the Remaking o f the World Order (1996), based on his 
earlier article of the same name.14 Here Huntington describes an increasingly intense 
“historical antagonism” between the Christian West and the Muslim world, discussing 
relations in the terms of a new Cold War.15 It is the incompatibility of the values of these 
two civilizations which will lead to future conflict. Facing off criticisms of Huntington’s 
thesis, Ronald Ingleheart and Pippa Norris back up the essentialist argument by using the 
World Values Survey to underline differences in social mentalities (mostly with regard to
12 Although the term “structuralist” is commonly used in literature, the term “essentialist” is unique to this 
study and refers to arguments which state the root cause o f underdevelopment is culturally specific.
13 Robert R. Kaufman, “The Patron-Client Concept and Macro Politics: Prospects and Problems,” 
Comparative Studies in Society and History Vol. 16, No.3 (Jan 1974): 285.
14 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash o f Civilizations and the Remaking o f the World Order (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1997).
15 Huntington, 212.
5
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gender and sexual liberalism) between Western and Islamic cultures.16 Arguing that 
culture may now override political realities to create conflict, they propose that societal 
values shape the structures of the Arab region, moving it away from democracy and 
reform.17 The impact of cultural realities on politics is also emphasised in Hisham 
Sharabi’s work Neopatriachy: A Theory o f Distorted Change in Arab Society (1988), 
which links authoritarianism in the Arab politics to the intense patriarchal environment in 
which it developed.18 According to Sharabi, these phenomena extend to Islamic traditions 
as well because they too have been formed around intensely patriarchal norms.19
Although the model presented by Sharabi, Huntington and Ingleheat-Norris each 
differ slightly, all come to the same essentialist conclusion. Each view traditional values 
and norms within Arabic society as the root of clientelism, tyranny and oppression in the
region. Political culture therefore becomes an overriding factor which prevents Arab
• • • •states from moving past patriarchy and authoritarianism.
The structuralist approach explains the systemic failure to achieve good 
governance in the Arab/Muslim world from a different approach. Instead of focusing on 
cultural generalities, the structuralist approach outlines specific historical or political 
factors which maintain the authoritarian status quo. One such theory, clientelism, 
describes all interactions as a series of rational exchanges between actors, regardless of 
their culture or religion. The roots of this theory can be traced to studies which began as 
early as the 1940s and 50s in the field of sociology and anthropology. Within two
16 Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “The True Clash o f Civilizations,” Foreign Policy No. 135 
(March/April 2003): 67-74.
17 Inglehart and Norris, 74.
18 Hisham Sharabi, Neopatriachy: A Theory o f Distorted Change in Arab Society (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988), 7.
19 Sharab, 11.
20 Moheb Zaki, Civil Society and Democratization in the Arab World: Annual Report 2004 (Cairo: Ibn 
Khaldun Center for Development Studies, 2004), 23.
6
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decades, the ramifications of this theory of interpersonal relations were being redefined
21and reinterpreted to gauge their impact on relationships between political actors. These
initial articles, often found in multi-disciplinary journals, would eventually culminate into
major works such as Eisenstadt and Roniger’s Patrons, Clients and Friends (1984),
Roniger and Gunes-Ayata’s Democracy, Clientelism and Civil Society (1994) and
Schmidt’s Friends, Followers and Factions (1977), the latter being extensively
• • 22committed to exploring the political ramifications of clientelism.
The nature and definitions of clientelism are for the most part consistent within 
the literature. Defined by Roniger and Gunes-Ayata (1994) as “asymmetric but mutually 
beneficial and open-ended transactions...”, clientelism has also been described as a 
“institutionalized general exchange” between political actors. According to 
Lemarchard and Lagg (1972), an unequal distribution of power is essential, as any 
equilibrium would cause the system to collapse.24 Others stress the difference between
clientelism and feudalism, arguing that unlike medieval political structures, modern
relations between the patron and the client are not overt and formalized. That said, laws 
can create an informal framework that facilitates transactions between the patron and the
21 See Rene Lemarchard and Keith Lagg, “Political Clientelism and Development,” Comparative Politics 
Vol. 4, No. 2 (Jan 1972): 149-178, Robert R. Kaufman, “The Patron Client Concept and Macro Politics: 
Prospects and Problems,” Comparative Studies o f  Society and History Vol. 16. No. 3 (January 1974): 284- 
308, S.N. Eisenstadt and Louis Roniger, “Patron-Client Relations as a Mode o f Structuring Social 
Exchange,” Comparative Studies in Society and History Vol. 22, No. 1 (Jan 1980): 42-77, and Sharon 
Kettering “The Historical Development o f Political Clientelism,” Journal o f Interdisciplinary History Vol. 
18, No. 3. (Winter 1988): 419-447.
22 Luis Roniger and Ayse Gunes-Ayata, Democracy. Clientelism and Civil Society (Boulder Lynne Reinner 
Publications, 1994), S.N. Eisenstadt and Luis Roniger, Patrons. Clients and Friends: Interpersonal 
Relations and the Structure o f Trust in Society (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), and Steffen 
W. Schmidt et al., comps., Friends Followers and Factions: A Reader in Political Clientelism (Los Angeles: 
University o f California Press, 1977).
23 Roniger and Gunes-Ayata, 3 and Eisenstadt and Roniger, Patrons. Clients and Friends: Interpersonal 
Relations and the Structure o f Trust in Society. 37.
24 Lemarchard and Lagg, 152.
25 Kettering, 420.
7
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subordinate.26 Finally, the informality of the transaction allows it to be theoretically
27voluntary, with the subordinate able to abandon their role if they choose.
The formation of a patron-client network also seems to be largely agreed upon, as 
those with control of resources seek to protect their subordinates from material 
instability.28 These resources can appear in several forms, but for the most part, they 
manifest most commonly as economic or political patronage. These relationships are 
not inherent to underdeveloped societies, but can advance and transform themselves as 
politics within a region develop.30 Bypassing cultural and religious factors, structuralist 
scholars argue a series of institutional realities put in place historically form an 
intractable system which restricts the movement of political groups.
The structuralist argument is much more apparent when examining works which 
deal with specific case studies, unlike the essentialist school which revolves mainly 
around broad generalized arguments. Instead of discussing the Muslim world as a whole, 
many structuralist case studies tend to focus on constitutional, legal, political or economic 
realities within a specific country to induce conclusions which can later be applied
o  1
regionally.
Several scholars have discussed the Egyptian system from a structuralist 
standpoint. A key example of this would be an article by Mona Makram-Ebeid (2001), 
which describes the political structures which impede the creation of a competitive
26 Kaufman, 297.
27 Roniger and Gunes-Ayata, 3 and Eisenstadt and Roniger, Patrons. Clients and Friends: Interpersonal 
Relations and the Structure o f Trust in Society. 48.
28 Roniger and Gunes-Ayata, 5.
29 Eisenstadt and Roniger, “Patron-Client Relations as a Mode o f Structuring Social Exchange”, 50.
30 Kettering, 419.
31 Much o f the literature examined here will focus on Egypt as case studies o f  additional countries are not 
entirely relevant for the purposes of this paper.
8
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multiparty system within Egypt.32 These include disrupting opposition parties’
33organization efforts and even engaging in tactics of sectarian slander to secure victory. 
With a monopoly on state resources, the ruling party under President Hosni Mubarak is 
able to control both the country’s legislature and media, passing censorship and 
emergency law restrictions that can be used to frustrate other political parties.34 Maye 
Kassem’s work Egyptian Politics: The Dynamics o f Authoritarian Rule (2004), outlines 
political tactics of the ruling party in great detail, demonstrating how the regime created a 
system where parliamentarians, civil servants and the military have direct political 
dependence on the executive.35
Legal restrictions also represent a major structural factor which bars reform and 
facilitates the patron-client system. Many of these impediments are found in the 
executive’s ability to manipulate the constitution to support their own purposes. 
Executive powers in the Egyptian constitution outweigh the powers of the judicial and 
legislative branches combined, making a centralized authoritarian state a reality which 
quickly results in clientelist relations.36 Moreover, the executive’s control over the ruling 
party in parliament and its ability to choose judges, undermines efforts to implement 
reform. These structures, according to the Arab Human Development Report, create a
32 Mona Makram-Ebeid, “Egypt’s 2000 Parliamentary Elections,” Middle East Policy Vol. VIII, No. 2 
(June 2001): 33.
33 Makram-Ebeid, 33.
34 Jihad Ouda, Negad al-Borai and Hafez Abu Se’ada, A Door to the Desert: Egyptian Parliamentary 
Elections in 2001. Course. Dilemmas and Recommendations for the Future: A Political and Legal Study, 
trans. Sohair Sabry (Cairo: United Group, 2001), 35-39.
35 Maye Kassem, Egyptian Politics: The Dynamics o f Authoritarian Rule (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2004), 19, 30, 32.
36 Ouda, al-Borai and Abu Se’ada, 19.
37 Kassem, 30, 36.
9
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“black-hole state” which freezes any attempt to challenge the regime or bypass the 
patron-client pyramid.
A great deal of attention has also fallen on the economic structures which bar 
reform in Arab states. Roger Owen’s monograph, State Power and Politics in the 
Making o f the Modern Middle East (2004) places extensive significance on strategic rents 
(such as foreign aid given to Egypt because of their support during the 1991 Gulf War) 
which give states economic autonomy from their population.39 Richards and Waterbury 
(1996) agree, arguing that social welfare systems used to co-opt citizenry financially into 
the patron-client system are propped up by economic rent.40 These funds allow the state 
to employ a massive workforce, giving the executive tremendous pressure over the 
economy and raising the negative consequences of citizens who wish to escape the 
patron-client system.41 
Islamism
Scholarly attention devoted to Islamist movements is significant in understanding 
the wider political environment which surrounds Egyptian system. The growth of 
political parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood and its more radical counterparts has a 
direct impact on the dynamics of the relationship between the Coptic Church and the 
Egyptian ruling party. In fact, so important is the role of Islamists on the relationship in 
question that an entire chapter of this study will be devoted to exploring how it affects the
38 Barbara Brewka, Zahir Jamal eds., Arab Human Rights Report 2004: Towards Freedom in the Arab 
World (New York, The United Nations Development Programme, 2005), 11.
39 Roger Owen, State Power and Politics in the Making o f the Modem Middle East. 3rd ed. (New York 
Routledge, 2004), 114-116.
40 Alan Richards and John Waterbury, A Political Economy o f the Middle East. 2nd ed. (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1996; reprint 1998), 209.
41 Merih Celasum, State Owned Enterprises in the Middle East and North Africa: Privatization and Reform 
(Cairo: American University o f Cairo Press, 2001), 65.
10
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Coptic mindset. For that reason, it is essential to examine the growing body of literature 
surrounding this phenomenon.
As with the discourse on good governance, several different arguments have 
developed to explain and describe the use of religion as a political ideology. Once again, 
the literature will be broken down within this study into two generalized branches, those 
that argue political Islam is a fa?ade masking traditional political ideologies, and those 
arguing that religious movements genuinely challenge the status quo.
Roger Owen (2004) argues that even the most secular leaders in the Muslim 
world have attempted to cloak their ideologies in the veil of Islam. Specifically, he 
focuses on the activities of former Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser, who despite 
his strong socialist leanings, produced an Islamic fatwa (religious ruling) supporting all 
of his major decisions.42 John L. Esposito (2005) agrees, arguing that Islam has been used 
to justify every imaginable system of government43 Oliver Roy’s work, The Failure o f  
Political Islam (1994), expands on this idea, claiming the link between Islamist political 
ideologies and the actual teachings of the religion is extremely problematic, as these 
movements often consists merely of dated socialist and nationalist ideas recast under a 
religious banner.44 Amyn B. Sajoo (2004) and Shireen Hunter (2005) agree, claiming 
that Islam has been used as a fa<?ade to serve several leaders’ agendas, especially in 
strengthening patronage.45
42 Owen, 29.
43 John L. Esposito, Islam: The Straight Path 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988 reprint 
2005), 223.
44 Oliver Roy, The Failure o f Political Islam, trans. Carol Volk (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 
1994), 4.
45 Amyn B. Sajoo, ed. Civil Society in the Muslim World: Contemporary Perspectives (New York: IB 
Tauris, 2004), 57 and Shireen T. Hunter and Huna Malk, eds., Modernization. Democracy and Islam 
(London: Praeger and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2005), 83.
11
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The other main argument contends that Islam is a challenge to the traditional 
state. Sullivan (1999), gives extensive evidence to describe how pervasive Islamist 
groups are within the regions’ NGOs, universities and youth groups.46 Wickham (2002), 
provides exhaustive details on the process of social and institutional Islamification, 
highlighting the way in which Islamist groups were able to spread throughout Egyptian 
proffessional syndicates during the 1980s and 1990s 47 The challenge of Islamists is not 
always seen as negative within this literature, as many scholars, such as Ebrahim Mossa, 
have given attention to ways in which these activists are attempting to harmonize their 
values with existing international norms such as the United Nations Charter of Human 
Rights.48
The Coptic Christians
Literature on the Coptic Christian Church in Egypt differs slightly when 
compared to works which focused on clientelism and Islamism, primarily because of the 
focus being on individuals or groups rather than a theory or ideology. Still, while there 
may have been few contradicting arguments, there were three principle methods of 
approaching discussions of the Coptic Christians. These approaches will be classified as 
the Islamist approach, the historical approach, and the political approach.
The Islamist approach to discussing the Coptic Christian community typically 
comes from Muslim scholars who place emphasis on primary sources of authority within 
Islam, such as the Qur 'an, as well as the actions of the Prophet Muhammad and his
46 Denis J. Sullivan and Sana Abed-Kotob, Islam in Contemporary Egypt: Civil Society vs. the State 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), 1, 29, 55.
47 Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, Mobilizing Islam: Religion. Activism and Political Change in Egypt (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 178-185.
48 Ebrahim Mossa, “The Dilemma o f Islamic Human Rights,” The Journal o f Law and Religion Vol. 15,
No. 1/2 (2000-2001): 195.
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closest companions. Within this framework, called the sunnah by Muslims, a theoretical 
body of knowledge exists to instruct Muslims on how to conduct relations with religious 
minorities. These constructs are therefore being closely examined by Islamists intent on 
creating modem and practical solutions within a religiously acceptable framework. A. 
Rahmam I. Doi’s study Non-Muslims under Shari’ah (1979) has examined the 
approaches early Muslims took towards Christians with great detail, stressing the positive 
nature of encounters for both sides.49 Using many of the authoritative Islamic examples 
discussed above, other prominent Islamist scholars such a Abdul a’la Mawdudi (1961) 
have also contributed to this approach, outlining a framework for dealing with non- 
Muslims in a theoretical Islamic state.50 Both discuss rights and responsibilities of non- 
Muslims under Islamic law, while defending the freedom they would enjoy as a protected 
minority.51 Other works, such as Sohirin Mohammad Solihin’s Copts and Muslims in 
Egypt: A Study in Harmony and Hostility (1991) are in response to particular political 
events in the relationship between Christians and Islamists in Egypt. Solihin recounts 
many of the same rights Islamic law gives to Christians that Doi and Mawdudi describe, 
but criticizes Copts for standing against attempts to codify Islamic law into the Egyptian 
criminal system.52
More traditional academic literature on the Coptic Christian Church is also 
divided. Many studies focus intensely on providing historical narratives of the Coptic
49 A. Rahman I. Doi, Non-Muslims under Shari’ah [Islamic Lawl (Brentwood: International Graphics, 
1979), 76.
50 Abdul a’la Mawdudi, The Rights o f Non-Muslims in the Islamic State, trans. Khurshid Ahmad (Lahore: 
Islamic Publications Limited, 1961), 4.
51 Mawdudi, 10, Doi, 26.
52 Sohirin Mohammad Solihin, Copts and Muslims in Egypt: A Study in Harmony and Hostility (Leicester: 
The Islamic Foundation, 1991), 74-77.
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• • 53community’s history as well as the various theological beliefs that the clergy expounds. 
Other studies, such as John H. Watson’s Among the Copts, have focused largely on 
historical movements within the clergy, a dynamic not easily observed.54 Given the 
proximity of Copts and other Christian groups to the Islamic world, several studies, such 
as Margret J. Wyszomirski’s Communal Violence: The Armenians and the Copts as Case 
Studies (1975) focus their attention on the realities of sectarian strife that have appeared 
throughout the centuries between Muslims and Christians.55
Examining the political activity of Copts in Egypt is largely considered a taboo 
activity, a stigma which has resulted in a severe deficit in scholarly literature. Since the 
revolution, only a few attempts have been made to examine the political inactivity of the 
Coptic Christians. B.L. Carter (1986) and Edward Wakin (1963) were two of the first 
Western scholars to deal directly with the role of Coptic Christians in Egyptian politics, 
outlining the rise of Copts in parliament before 1952 and the various discriminatory 
realities which prevented the community from engaging politically under Nasser.56 More 
recent examinations have focused on the role of the Coptic Church, as the clergy’s place 
in politics has expanded greatly under the presidency of Hosni Mubarak, at the expense 
of secular Coptic movements.57 The most comprehensive text on the Coptic political 
activities is S.S. Hasan’s Copts vs. Muslims in Modern Egypt: The Centuries Long
53 See Kenneth Cragg, The Arab Christian: A History o f the Middle East (Westminster, John Knox Press, 
1991), Robert Brenton Betts Christians in the Arab East (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1978), and Otto F. A. 
Meinardus, Two Thousand Years o f  Coptic Christianity (Cairo: American University o f  Cairo Press, 1999).
54 John H. Watson, Among the Copts (Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2000; reprint, 2002).
55 Margret J. Wyszomirski, “Communal Violence: The Armenians and the Copts as Case Studies,” World 
Politics Vol. 27, No. 3 (April 1975): 430-455.
56 B.L. Carter, The Conts in Egyptian Politics (London: Croom Helm, 1986) and Edward Wakin, A Lonely 
Minority: The Modem Story o f Egypt’s Copts (William Morrow, 1963; reprint, Lincoln: iUniverse.com, 
Inc., 2000), ix.
57 See Nelly Van Doom-Harder and Kari Vogt, eds., Between the Desert and the City: The Coptic 
Orthodox Church Today (Oslo: The Institute for Comparative Research in Human Culture, 1997) and Maya 
Shatzmiller ed., Nationalism and Minority Identities in Islamic Societies (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2005).
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Struggle for Coptic Equality (2003). Hasan’s focus on Church activities, theology, and 
the clerical monopolization of the Coptic political space demonstrates many of the critical 
foundations for the Coptic community’s lack of political participation.58
The existing literature is problematic in several ways. First, studies on the 
political activities of the Coptic Christian community are in their infancy. Examinations 
for the most part have been sporadic and are now often dated. Popular conceptions of 
the relationship between the Copts and the ruling party is also inaccurate, describing the 
relationship as a simple unidirectional model, with the Coptic Church represented as a 
victim of state discrimination. This however, does little to explain the significant 
warming of relations between the clergy and the executive branch that has occurred under 
the Presidency of Hosni Mubarak. Moreover, it does not reflect evidence collected by 
this study which suggests a reciprocal yet asymmetrical relationship between the Church 
and state. This study hopes to contribute an alternative understanding of Coptic political 
realities in Egypt by linking it to the broader failure for democratic reform in the region. 
Methodology
The evidence within this research will primarily be qualitative, as political norms 
are difficult to assess empirically without significant polling. Polling in the developing 
world represents a serious challenge which cannot easily be overcome. Language 
barriers and financial demands present a challenge that is simply not surmountable at this 
level.59 Alternative polling strategies, such as email or telephone polling is also not 
feasible because of the minimal technological capacity of Egyptians who reside outside
58 S.S. Hasan. Copts vs. Muslims in Modem Egypt: The Centuries Long Struggle for Coptic F,quality (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2003).
59 Several studies, such as those by Mark Tessler, have attempted to carry out polling in the Middle East 
and North Africa. Despite these important contributions, the region remains more difficult to quantitatively 
examine than other areas within the developed world.
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of major urban centres. Moreover, due to the sensitive nature of this topic, permission 
from the Egyptian Government to engage in such research is unlikely, and participation 
would be difficult to secure. Those who do participate in polling may not understand the 
questions being asked (due to lack of education), may face serious repercussions for their 
answers (raising significant ethical concerns) or may have been coerced to provide 
responses that are misleading.
Textual Research
That said, there is a wealth or writings on good governance and Islamism in Egypt 
and the Arab region. These studies are significantly helpful when attempting to describe 
the political environment that Coptic Christians belong within. Moreover, within this 
study, several unpublished reports were collected with the help of the various human 
rights groups in Cairo. These reports, discussing legal, constitutional and sectarian 
issues, were extremely helpful in forming a situational understanding. Moreover, reports 
on specific events, such as the recent violence in Alexandria during the autumn of 2005, 
were extremely detailed and constructive to the research process.
Qualitative evidence on Egyptian religious norms is available in the theology and 
religious teachings of both the Egyptian Orthodox Church and Islamic scholars. This 
includes doctrines on how Islam is to deal with religious minorities (commonly termed 
dhimmis) and Orthodox Christian ascetic values which stress a retreat from civilization, 
both themes that will be stressed in this study. An examination of these (and other) 
doctrines through religious text and scholarly writings will provide a strong base for 
gauging the religious norms of these two traditions, helping to illustrate what impact 
these have on the relationship in question.
16
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Interview Structure and Participants
Research into Egyptian religious norms and the patron-client system in Egypt was 
carried out through unstructured interviews with a variety of experts within the Egyptian 
political system. The choice to not structure the interviews was deliberate, as the 
sensitive nature of this topic often requires similar questions to be asked differently to 
experts from different ideological/religious backgrounds. Interviews were held with 
representatives from human rights groups, Coptic journalists, Egyptian legal experts, and 
Islamist in order to gain a wide perspective of how the issue of Coptic political 
participation was conceptualized. This was significant due to time constraints which did 
not allow for repeated extensive interviews. Therefore, interviews presented in this paper 
will represent a broad thematic discourse from a variety of significant perspectives, rather 
than a focused and detailed presentation of one.
Due to the financial and time constraints which faced this thesis, as well as the 
previously mentioned factors which frustrate quantitative research in Egypt, a significant 
amount of emphasis is placed on expert interviews as a source of evidence. Although 
this process was extremely beneficial, this study in no way alleges it can clearly and 
comprehensively demonstrate in empirical terms that the dynamics of the Coptic-state 
relationship are as the qualitative evidence describes. That said, this study hopes to 
succeed in outlining an alternative perspective with which to understand Coptic political 
realities.
Interview Questions
The questions themselves were thematically consistent and discussed several key 
points, including, the Church’s relationship with the executive, whether President
17
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Mubarak has improved Coptic human rights within Egypt, the positive and negative 
impact of the clergy’s monopoly of the Christian community’s political discourse, and 
the impact of Coptic theology on political participation. Other questions involved 
gauging the impact of Islamist groups on sectarian tensions, whether the executive 
manipulates religious sentiments to maintain control, and the role of the Coptic diaspora 
on Muslim-Christian relations within Egypt. Secondary questions were also raised and 
were typically particular to each expert. This was to take advantage of unique personal or 
professional insight that each had for the topic. Once again, a broad range of questions 
were asked in order to take advantage of limited access to those being interviewed. In 
depth examinations of each topic would have required several extensive meetings which 
were not possible to secure. Since expediency was paramount, effort went to establishing 
a consistent foundation with which to draw out overlapping themes.
Additional Resources
Significant material was collected from conferences that revolved around the 
problem of religious freedom in Egypt. Unlike the interviews, these conferences would 
be held in Arabic rather than English, presenting a significant linguistic barrier. In order 
to overcome this conference sessions would be recorded in Arabic with the permission of 
the discussion groups’ organizers. Translators were obtained to simultaneously relay the 
discussion in English for recording in written notes. Additional primary material was 
made available during these conferences, including NGO reports on sectarian violence 
(the reports had been previously translated into English).
18
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
Ethics
Ethical considerations were therefore fairly minimal. First, interviews rarely 
raised confidential information, as questions were directed to draw out the expert’s 
knowledge of their field. Each person interviewed was extensively educated, and 
therefore demonstrated a strong intellectual capacity to understand what was being asked 
of them. Before each interview commenced, permission was secured to use answers in 
scholarly publications, including this thesis. Each was made aware of any recording 
devices and was given the option of asking for the recording to pause in order to relay 
confidential information.
Every attempt to maintain strict ethical standards was pursued because of the 
potential harm which could come when discussing sensitive information in political 
environment such as Egypt. Despite the nature of the people interviewed, their answers 
can be politically damaging if misused, and all efforts have been taken to ensure that 
notes and recordings remained secure while in Egypt.
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C h a p t e r  T w o : T h e o r e t i c a l  C o n s i d e r a t i o n s
In order to describe the constraints facing Coptic political participation in Egypt, 
it is necessary to link them to the greater political realities in the region. Whereas most 
studies have linked Coptic political inactivity to the intolerance of a primarily Muslim 
society, it is the opinion of this study that it is linked to the very same phenomenon that 
suppresses any sort of pluralism in the region. If the environment was simply one of 
intolerance and persecution, one would expect to see the Coptic Church take an 
antagonistic stance to the system,60 pushing for greater political participation in order to 
combat discrimination. Instead, the Church encourages its members to actively support 
the secular ruling party and censures Copts who are critical of the executive authority.61 
This tendency towards internal censorship does not exist with regards to Islamic
fi)extremism, as the Church has often been critical of sectarian violence. What therefore, 
is the nature and roots of this system of control? The following chapter will attempt to 
answer this by focusing on theories that outline possible structural constraints to what has 
been termed as ‘good governance’ in the Arab region. This process will attempt to 
ascertain which theory is the most accurate when describing failures of political pluralism 
in general and particularly within the relationship between Copts and the Egyptian state.
60 As it did under the Presidency o f Anwar Sadat, a period which will be examined in detail later in this 
study.
61 This will be explored in greater detail in Chapter 5.
62 The relationship between the Church and Islamic extremism will be explored in Chapter 4.
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It is widely accepted that political movement within the Arab region is greatly 
constrained.63 Therefore, the foundation of this system of control must be weighed as 
several paradigms have been developed to describe the political realities of Arab states.
For some time, attention has been given to why the Arab region has failed to 
develop principles of ‘good governance’. Before continuing, it is important to 
acknowledge that the notion of what good governance itself represents is problematic. 
That said this study will seek to avoid prolonged discussion over what Thomas Wiess 
describes as a term which outlines ideas of global problem solving at all levels.64 At the 
same time however, it will accept that political and economic reforms in the Arab region 
have, generally speaking, fallen behind most other regions in the world. Moreover, it will 
be assumed that the ability to carry out changes is curtailed primarily by internal 
phenomenon.
Explanations over the resiliency of Arabic regimes to resist change have largely 
treated this region as exceptional to world norms. As mentioned in Chapter One, 
essentialist arguments bypass longstanding historical and political realities in order to focus 
a great deal of emphasis on arguments which suggest the region is religiously or culturally 
incompatible with ‘good governance’ principles. These conclusions will be deconstructed 
in the following section in order to critically analyze whether Islamic or Arabic social 
norms represent a mindset which keeps the political status quo of Arab regimes intact.
63 Attention will be given in detail to this in Chapter 3, where discussion o f the roots o f Egyptian state 
power will be outlined.
64 Thomas G. Wiess, “Governance, Good Governance and Global Governance; Conceptual and Actual 
Changes,” Third World Quarterly Vol. 21, No. 5 (2000): 796.
21
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
Islam and Good Governance
As described above, the religion of Islam is regularly associated with the failure 
of the Arab Region to adopt ideas of good governance. The first step in examining this 
claim is selecting a definition for the term ‘religion’. Sociologists such as E.B. Taylor 
have described religion as a person’s relationship with a supernatural being. For Emile 
Durkheim, religion was a term which outlined one’s response to the “sacred”.65 For the 
purposes of this study however, the definition for religion will, perhaps arrogantly, 
diverge from the opinion these great scholars, as interest here lies in the teachings of the 
religion itself and not its sociological elements. Therefore, religion will be defined 
wholly as a “theological ideal” which can be best understood by examining a particular 
faith’s fundamental teachings.
A polemic against the essentialists would be tangential, as only a concise 
overview of the key arguments is necessary to show that links between good governance 
failures and Islam are problematic.66 One of the earliest essentialist arguments is found 
in the German sociologist Max Weber’s classic work on religion and modernity, which 
described Islam as completely devoid of “rational thinking” and represented an ideology 
which could never be compatible with a progressive state.67 More modem scholars, like 
Bernard Lewis, maintain that Islam represents a system which failed to absorb Western 
innovations and steadily closed its doors to ideas of modernity. While Weber’s study 
can be seen in light of the historical period in which he was writing, Lewis’ modem
65 Vicky Randall and Robin Theobald eds., Political Change and Underdevelopment: A Critical 
Introduction to Third World Politics. 2nd ed. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), 61.
66 Such a study has already largely been complied in Edward Said’s Orientalism (New York: Random 
House, 1978).
67 Hunter and Malik, 11.
68 See Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong? The Clash Between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East 
(New York: Perennial, 2002).
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explanations lack any evidence that Islam is theologically detrimental to progress. He 
instead largely limits himself to describing the fall of the Islamic world from its place of 
cultural predominance rather than explaining why this occurred.
Many arguments do however go further and examine particular interpretations 
of Islamic theology, emphasising parts which seem to support the idea of authoritarian 
rule. For instance, many scholars draw a correlation between the Islamic idea of a 
sovereign and absolute God and the prevalence of non-democratic states in the Middle 
East. This religious belief, it is claimed, gives Arab authoritarian states a strong 
ideological foundation.69
Drawing correlations between Islam and politics is, in reality, much more difficult
than scholars often suggest. Islam itself is hardly a monolithic entity, and has been used
by both governments and opposition groups as a way to build legitimacy for their
policies.70 In fact, according to John L. Esposito,
The many interpretations and uses of Islam by 
governments, movements, and individuals have produced a 
diversity of ideologies, actors, organizations and programs.
Islam in recent years has been used to legitimize 
monarchies (Morocco and Saudi Arabia), military regimes 
(Pakistan, Libya, the Sudan) and a theocracy (Iran). Self- 
styled Islamic regimes have spanned the political spectrum, 
from radical socialism in Libya, to the conservative Saudi
71monarchy.
Clearly Islam, a religion of 1.2 billion people spanning countless cultures and 
ethnicities is too diverse to have broad and superficial conclusions prove accurate. In 
fact; Oliver Roy has argued that the Muslim world can be divided into no less than four
69 Shrabi, 29.
70 Esposito, The Straight Path o f Islam. 159.
71 Ibid., 223.
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79unique spheres, including Indo-Sunni, Arab-Sunni, Turkish Sunni and Persian-Shi’ite. 
In reality, even these classifications encompass an enormous diversity of traditions. 
Furthermore, the link between Islamist political ideology and the actual teachings of the 
religion is problematic, as Roy successfully argues these movements that often consist
-i t
merely of dated socialist and nationalist ideas that are recast under a religious banner.
Given the broad nature of Islam, the only accurate way of gauging the religion’s 
opinion on governance is to avoid a focus on the historical actions of Muslim leaders, but 
to concentrate on the teachings of Islam’s key sources of authority. For the 
overwhelming majority of Muslims, the fundamental sources of authority are textual, and 
include the Qur ’an (believed by Muslims to the literal word of God spoken through the 
Prophet Muhammad), the Hadith (representing collected accounts of the Prophet’s own 
sayings and actions as reported by his closest companions) and the sunnah (the pratical 
example of the Prophet Muhammad). The Qur ’an speaks of governance indirectly, and, 
despite the claims of Islamic political movements, holds few specifics for describing the 
ideal political system. That said, it does instruct believers to conduct “their affairs by 
mutual consultation”.74 This notion appears again in the Qur’an, when Muhammad is 
told by God to “consult them [members of the community] in affairs (of the moment)”.75 
According to the tafsir, or Qur’anic commentary of Abdullah Yusuf Ali, these passages 
refer to the concept of shura or consultation, an Arabic social construct which will be
7 f\examined in the coming paragraphs.
72 Roy, 2.
73 Ibid., 4.
74 Qur’an 42:38.
73 Qur’an 3:159
76 Abdullah Yusuf Ali, The Meaning of the Holy Qur’an. 10th ed. (Beltsville: Amana Publications, 1999), 
1257.
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The hadith also make mention of the notion of responsible governance and the 
importance of confronting tyranny. Ibn Umar reported that Muhammad once said “every 
one of you is a ruler and every one of you shall be responsible for those you rule...”
77(Bukhari 11:11) Ali also makes mention of the following Prophetic statement:
70
“obedience is due only in that which is good.” (Bukhari 64:61). Other hadith (found in 
Tirmidhi 17) states, “the most excellent jihad is the uttering of truth in the presence of an
7Qunjust ruler”.
Although the above sayings are considered parts of the Prophet’s sunnah, more
evidence of Islam’s insistence on consultation can be derived from the biography of
Muhammad. In the lead up to the first major engagement between the Muslim
community and Mecca’s pagan tribes, Muhammad consistently consulted with his army
on every major development. As his force made preparations around the wells of Badr,
one of Muhammad’s followers, A1 Hubab ibn al Mundhir ibn al Jamuh, made the
following critic:
O Prophet of God, is this spot where you have dismounted 
a place to which God has guided you and, therefore, may 
we neither step beyond it nor stay far behind it? Or is this 
simply a question of ordinary war strategy, of measures and 
moves and counter measures and moves?80
When Muhammad answered it was the latter, Al Hubab suggested a new position 
which would cut off pagan army from the well’s water. Afterwards, Muhammad “sent a 
reminder to all his companions that he is but a man like them, that all decisions have to
77 Maulana Muhammad Ali, A Manual o f Hadith (Dublin: The Ahmadiyya Anjuman Ishaat Islam Lahore 
USA Inc., 1941; reprint, 2001), 328.
78 Ali, 331.
79 Ibid., 332.
80 Muhammad Husayn Haykal, The Life o f Muhammad. 8th ed., trans. Isma’il Ragi A. Al Faruqi (American 
Trust Publications, 1976), 217-224.
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be taken by all of them in consultation with one another, that he will not decide anything 
without them finally, and that he stands in great need of their good counsel.”81 Although 
this situation underlines God’s unquestionable authority in Islam, consultation is clearly 
stipulated amongst decisions made by human leadership, even that of Muhammad 
himself. It is therefore hard to justify the core teachings of Islam as encouraging 
anything but an open and participatory system of governance, even if that has not been 
adhered to by Muslim rulers in practice.
iL
Many Islamic scholars, such as the 19 Century Kurd, Abd al-Rahman al-
Kawakibi, wrote extensively on Islam and the state, and argued that the religion rejects
ideas of corruption and despotism and promotes the belief that “the just state, in which
men fulfill themselves, is that in which the individual is free and freely serves the
community, and in which the government watches over this freedom but is itself
controlled by the people; this is what the true Islamic state was”.82 Moreover, according
to an Islamists interviewed by Kevin Dwyer, the theology of Islam would in fact, greatly
challenge the authority of the state.
As man is the representative of God on earth, there is an 
equality between the governed and the governor. Islam 
gives no more weight to the views of the governor to those 
of the governed. This is of great importance and has three 
correlates. First, Islam does not provide a foundation for 
the state. Of course there is a tie between religion and 
politics, but our basic texts do not call for the state. That is 
why I believe that the Islamic state must be basically a non­
state society, where civil society must attain real power in 
order not to be absorbed by the state. Second whatever 
state we have, it must not be very strong, it must only be 
strong in essential but limited domains...human freedom is
81 Haykal, 217-224.
82 Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age (London: Oxford University Press 1962; reprint, New 
York: Cambridge University Press 2004), 272.
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essential to Islam, because only with such freedom will 
dispute and struggle possibly lead us to the best answers.
The idea of Islam weakening state authoritarianism is also shared by Oliver Roy, 
who argues that totalitarianism seems to only rise in the Muslim world when society is in 
shambles.84 Arguments that place Islam at the root of the Arab region’s failure to develop 
regimes of good governance have not taken into account the fairly clear demands for 
democratic and transparent governance which exist in the religion’s fundamental sources. 
At a practical level, Islamic teachings, admittedly, have been used in condemnation of 
Western notions of good governance. In the light of the above discussion however, it 
seems, in fact, it is more likely that Islamic teachings are not the cause of authoritarian 
ideologies, but are themselves often manipulated to grant legitimacy to regimes in order 
to turn popular opinion against reform.
Arabic Cultural Norms and Good Governance
The concept of a cultural incompatibility that exists between the Arab region and 
the principles of political reform is also extremely widespread and repeatedly based on 
tenuous correlations and generalizations. One example of this is the repeated critical 
examinations of early childhood education which is argued to be the root cause of 
stagnated political cultures in the Arab Region. An example of this can be found in the 
2003 Arab Human Development Report, which states most Arab children are exposed to 
an authoritarian/overprotective style of child rearing, a philosophy which results in weak 
decision making skills and passivity.85 Sociological evidence often leads to correlations
83 Kevin Dwyer, Arab Voices: The Human Rights Debate in the Middle East (Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1991), 216.
84 Roy, 9.
85 Kristen Helmore and Zahir Jamal, eds., Arab Human Development Report 2003: Building a Knowledge 
Based Society (New York: United Nations Development Programme, 2003), 51.
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between the childhood acceptance of the father’s dominance over the domestic household
• 86and the later acceptance of an authoritarian state’s control over the public sphere. In 
essence, these arguments claim the socialization of Arab children creates a future adult 
mentality in which the legitimacy of a staunchly vertical power structure is unquestioned.
Sociological evidence of Arab culture can, however, demonstrate strong 
foundations for good governance principles. While discussing the textual sources for 
authority within Islam, several references were made to the practice of shura or 
consultation, an Arabic tribal construct which will now be explored in detail. The 
traditional Arab authority structure was not as vertically entrenched as often suggested. 
Although staunchly patriarchal vertical units did exist, with bay’ah (homage) regularly 
given to the sayyid (tribal chief), he did not have unlimited powers of authority. His 
position would more accurately be described as a “first among equals” within his sphere 
of influence, as other positions of authority, such as the hakam (wise man or tribal elders) 
were often highly regarded.87 Within nomadic tribes, the tribal chief, called the Shaykh 
al-Qabilah was elected based on what the community judged to be outstanding 
characteristics such as bravery, generosity, modesty, eloquence, patience and clemency.88 
There was therefore no divine or mystical rationale on which his position was founded. 
Moreover, the sayyid did not make decisions independently, but through majority-rules 
decisions of a tribal council which included family chiefs, soothsayers, poets and other 
individuals judged to have outstanding leadership character.89 Many tribes gave every
86 Shrabi, 7.
87 Hamid Dabasi, Authority in Islam: From the Rise o f Muhammad to the Establishment o f the Umawads 
(London: Transaction Publishers, 1989), 83, 91-92.
88 Mishal Fahm al Sulami, The West and Islam: Liberal Democracy vs. the System o f Shura (New York: 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 37-38.
89 Al Sulami, 38.
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person the right to speak so that transparency would allow inter-communal trust to 
remain firm.90 Even after decisions were made, there was no executive authority to 
enforce the decisions. Tribal authorities could only boycott and isolate those who refused 
to obey their rulings.91
Settled communities, such as the trading centre Mecca, were also ruled by a tribal 
council, which discussed wars, the annual pilgrimage (which pre-dates Islam) and civil 
matters such as marriage and divorce. Other Arabian settlements, such as Saba (Sheba), 
were monarchies, but with a rule that was far from absolute. In fact, decisions made by 
the King of Saba needed to be approved by a Majlis al-Shura (consolation council) in 
order to be enacted.92
Socially, according to W. Montgomery Watt, each mature male felt equal in 
standing to the sayyid. The tribal chief, although in a position of esteem, could only 
persuade his kinsman, not command them.93 Even in times of war and crisis, when 
emergency authority was granted to the sayyid, a time limit would often be stipulated to 
keep power from being centralized.94
Still, many critical sociological observations do indeed represent genuine cultural 
constructs in the Arab region. Despite this however, it is unlikely that these are 
responsible for political stagnation. The presence of patriarchal norms is in no way 
exceptional to Arab culture and society and cultures with similar mentalities have 
succeeded in establishing stable liberal democratic traditions throughout the 20th
90 Ibid., 38.
91 Ibid., 38.
92 Ibid., 39.
93 W. Montgomery Watt, Islamic Political Thought (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1968), 40.
94 Watt, 40.
29
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
Century.95 Moreover, in order to illustrate Arab exceptionalism towards good 
governance, evidence would have to clearly demonstrate that such ideas were completely 
alien to political discourse in Arabic cultures. This is clearly not the case, as historical 
evidence shows that Arab society has repeatedly questioned the nature of government, 
using language that strongly mirrors contemporary writing. Once again, a thorough 
overview of the literature would be tangential, and the following examples are meant 
only to demonstrate that such a discourse was ongoing. One key example would be the 
late 19th Century newspaper al-Jinan, founded by Butrus al-Bustani in 1870. In one 
edition, al-Jinan describes the East as “once prosperous and civilized” but had now fallen 
into a downward spiral of “bad government”. According to Bustani, the only remedy was 
a regime of “good government” based on the principles of patriotism, education, division 
of powers, an independent judiciary and separation of religion from state.96 Other 
scholars, such as the 19th century al-Afghani, argued tirelessly against those who believed 
Arabic culture and religion were not compatible with modem technology and political 
reforms.97
The 2003 Freedom Survey in its attempts to gauge political values of different 
cultures is further evidence against the idea of cultural exceptionalism. Results in the 
Arab Region were strongly in favour of democratic reforms, with over seventy-five 
percent of respondents listing greater political freedoms as an issue of primary concern.98 
In fact, detailed questions on the survey gauged the Arab perception of various attributes 
which make up a regime of good governance, finding little distinction between the values
95 An excellent example would be Japan, whose rigidly authoritarian society has maintained both 
democracy and a highly competitive capitalist economy for over sixty years.
96 Hourani, 263.
97 Hourani, 272.
98 Brewka and Jamal, 97.
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of the Arab Region and other developing states. Patriarchal values may therefore have a 
very strong place in Arabic society, but these values seem to hold little significant in the 
Arab mind to questions of politics and good governance.
The above only discusses values of Arab society, and does not discount the 
possibility that patriarchal relationships are at the core of Arab failure to achieve political 
reform. In fact, evidence is extremely strong to suggest that a system of exchange and 
constraint exist within most Arab states which maintain the elite’s power base." 
Patriarchal relationships however, relate only to exchanges made between those sharing a 
primordial link, such as those that exist between kinsmen.100 For much of the Arab 
region, especially republics such as Syria and Egypt, this is not necessarily the case. 
Evidence suggests a system which is much more pervasive, tying diverse groups together 
within the state’s authoritative mechanisms. This is clearly the case within Egypt, whose 
regime must maintain controls over a diverse ethnic and religious population. This 
ability to cross primordial barriers calls into question the power of patriarchy and would 
instead suggest an entrenched patron-client relationship of control.101 While this 
difference between a clientelist system and a patriarchal one may seem of little 
consequence, it removes the idea that the cause of political stagnation is one of culture or 
religion. This assertion is supported by research which has identified dynamics of 
clientelism all over the world, providing a theoretical framework in which arguments of
109“culturally based irrationality” are undermined. This is especially important for the 
purposes of this study, as it provides a theoretical basis on which to examine political
99 Once again, this will be discussed in detail in the following chapter.
100 Peter Flynn, “Class, Clientelism and Coercion: Some Mechanisms of Internal Dependency and Control,” 
Journal o f Commonwealth and Comparative Politics Vol. 2 Issue 2: 135.
101 Schmidt et al., xxxv.
102 Kaufman, 285.
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constructs in the Arab region as a series of rationally constructed exchanges between the 
regime and various non-state political actors.
Clientelism
Outlining what is actually meant by the term ‘clientelism” will now monopolize 
the remainder of this chapter, as the literature on the phenomenon is quite extensive. As 
mentioned in the introduction, the theoretical framework behind patron-client theory 
developed in the 1940s with a series of anthropological and sociological studies on the 
nature of inter-personal relationships.103 It was only in the 1970s that serious attention 
was given to this phenomenon in the wider social sciences.104 Essentially, patron-client 
theory discusses a reality in which a personalized and reciprocal relationship between an 
inferior and a superior party develops on the basis of creating a mutually beneficial 
relationship.105 Key to this definition is the idea of the asymmetrical nature of this 
relationship, in which one party has much greater control over the allocation of power 
and resources. If the client gains too much strength, the system collapses.106 Unlike 
other exchanges, clientelism is never fully legitimized, remaining always in someway an
1 07informal and voluntary agreement.
Dyadic clientelist relations are the base level in which this phenomenon exits. 
That said, dyadic exchanges come in various forms, many of which are not clientelist. 
For instance, dyadic relationships can exist at the horizontal level, consisting of mutual 
exchanges of resources between actors of the same level. Typically these dyads form 
when actors at the same societal level provide different resources to the relationship,
103 Eisenstaat and Roniger, Patrons. Clients and Friends. 3.
104 Roniger and Gunes-Ayata, 3.
105 Lemarchand and Lagg, 151.
106 Kaufman, 285.
107 Roniger and Gunes-Ayata, 4.
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resulting in equal benefit to both.108 These exchanges allow both actors to obtain
resources at lower cost than can otherwise be secured ad hoc in the market place.109
Since there is no clear hierarchy between the actors, this relationship can not be
considered clientelist, a phenomenon which demands a clear power asymmetry.110
The same is true of dyadic exchanges that happen within primordial units such as
the family or tribe. Here, the exchange of resources may be linked to social motivations
which ignore reciprocal demands. Clientelist interactions however, must consist of an
exchange which has been determined by the more powerful of the two participants.111
Within a society, dyads eventually form chains and finally pyramid structures in
112which regional patrons provide services for multiple local clients. While many of these 
processes could be carried out by primordial groups, that is not always necessarily the 
case. In traditional societies, relations between a landlord and local peasants, common 
throughout Europe and other agrarian cultures, marks the most easily observable 
examples of non-primordial interactions.113
One of the strengths of clientelist theory was the theoretical understanding that the 
phenomenon evolves along side a country’s economic development.114 Where as 
patriarchal ties are predominant between actors within traditional societies, clientelism 
continues to evolve along with a modernizing society, becoming a phenomenon based on 
“formalized general exchange” on an institutionalized level.115 New patron-client
108 Schm idt e t al., x iv-xv.
109 Ibid., xv.
110 Lemarchand and Lagg, 151
111 Eisenstadt and Roniger, Patrons. Clients and Friends. 48.
112 Christopher Clapham ed., Private Patronage and Public Power: Political Clientelism in the Modem State 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1982), 6.
113 Clapham, 2.
114 Roniger and Gunes-Ayata, 12.
115 Eisenstadt and Roniger, Patrons. Clients and Friends. 37, 227.
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identities are formed as personal relationships are replaced by institutional ones such as 
union or party membership.116 According to Eisenstadt and Roniger, “instead of limited, 
direct personal relations to one patron, more complicated networks of patrons, brokers 
and clients emerge. These are often organized pyramidally, consisting of chains that may 
run right through the administration.”117 This industrialized clientelism sees local strong 
men become merely a chain linking the periphery to politicians and administrators who 
often use “their positions to build a personal following and [to] gain access to official 
positions in the administration, then wield the resources and services controlled by their 
incumbency to expand their clientelist network.”118
Brokers and middle men will always represent a challenge to the patron as they 
themselves press to control relations with the client.119 As power becomes centralized 
however, the patron institution (usually the government itself at this stage), will seek to 
create direct links with the periphery.120 This allows the regime to have greater autonomy 
while reducing the power of rival bases within the system. This can be done using party 
officials and bureaucratic institutions which become strong enough to link the core to the 
periphery. By frustrating the advancement of brokers, regimes create a system by which 
the only way to advance is to please the patron directly and without the filter of a 
broker’s demands. This also allows the regime more freedom to focus the attention of 
their different clients by creating a sense of rivalry between them. This undermines 
horizontal solidarity between groups that may otherwise join together.121 For the most
116 Roniger and Gunes-Ayata, 22.
117 Eisenstadt and Roniger, Patrons. Clients and Friends. 228.
118 Roniger and Gunes-Ayata, 11-12.
119 Eisenstaat and Roniger, Patrons. Clients and Friends. 244.
120 Schmidt et al., 326.
121 S.N. Eisenstadt and Rene Lemarchand, Political Clientelism: Patronage and Development (Beverly 
Hills: Sage Publications, 1981), 276.
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part, such a transition is essential to maintaining stability in the system, as the modem 
age opens up a wealth of information to the periphery, allowing clients to compare 
patrons and withdraw support if they find an exchange which is better suited to them.122 
If the patron bypasses the broker, they can deal directly with weaker elements of society 
which may be co-opted with fewer resources. The greater the power difference is 
between patron and client, the more the weaker actor will have no choice but to remain in 
the relationship or loose the ability to access the basic resources needed for survival.123
Key to this development is the system of controls a patron can place over political 
or economic power.124 Control of the political system is perhaps the most common way 
of achieving this, since a patron-regime has the mechanisms of the state to provide the 
process with greater legitimacy. Challengers to the patron now can be met with various 
constitutional restraints. Although the patron-client relationship remains technically 
informal, legal realities are often introduced to tacitly institutionalize the exchange.125 In 
fact, according to Robert R. Kaufman, ideas that clientelism exists in societies with weak 
legal foundations is fallacious, as the phenomenon is often indirectly facilitated within a
i v
strict legal framework. As a patron (again, usually a government regime) obtains 
hegemonic control over resources and political power and sets up institutional framework 
to entrench the clientelist exchange, an “encapsulated society” forms and infiltrates all
127facets of activity. Overtime, the affected society may loose the “ethic of public
122 Eisenstadt and Lemarchand, 40.
123 Schmidt et al., 131.
124 These systems o f control will be discussed with regards to Egypt in the following chapter.
125 Lemarchand and Lagg, 153.
126 Kaufman, 294.
127 Clapham, 9.
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allocation” and see clientelist interactions as the only legitimate way to access 
128resources.
This study will attempt to link the above phenomenon to the failure of Egypt to 
develop democratic institutions in which the Copts can participate. Within the Egyptian 
system itself, several strategic clientelist relationships have been developed to reward 
acceptance of the status-quo and weaken those who challenge it. This essentially 
establishes an intractable reality in which little can be accomplished without the regime’s 
approval.
Now that clientelism has been selected as a base for the following study, some 
attention has to be given to what critics have described as the theory’s weakness. From a 
sociology standpoint, clientelism has been criticised for its assumption of a harmonized 
society, as there seems to be little discussion of conflict between actors within the 
paradigm.129 In the case of the Copts in Egypt, conflict most certainly exists between the 
community as a whole and other groups within Egyptian society. For the most part 
however, this conflict is latent, suppressed by the clientelist system. In the cases of 
manifest conflict which will be discussed in Chapter Four, it will be demonstrated that 
the modem outbreaks of violence usually occur within the periphery of Egyptian society. 
Conflict between the patron regime and the client Church however, has not become 
manifest since the establishment of a clientelist relationship. This is not because conflict
1 TOdisappears, but instead is because positive reciprocity provides a stabilizing function 
which keeps conflict suppressed.
128 Clapham, 8.
129 Eisenstadt and Lemarchand, 9.
130 Schmidt et al., 39.
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Other criticisms state that the clientelist paradigm is reductionist in nature, 
narrowing all interactions into one unified category.131 Within this study however, no 
claim has been made to suggest that all interactions exist within the clientelist framework, 
only that this paradigm is an alternative and useful way to describe the system of 
exchanges which concern Coptic political participation.
131 Eisenstadt and Lemarchand, 11.
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C h a p t e r  T h r e e : C l i e n t e l i s m  a n d  C o n t r o l  i n  t h e  E g y p t i a n  S y s t e m  
Now that clientelism has been discussed in theory, focus will shift in this chapter 
towards examining the process in which the phenomenon has manifested itself within the 
country’s political system. During the 19th and early 20th Centuries, British rule over 
Egypt precipitated a strong shift in governance styles from what existed under the 
Ottoman Empire. Whereas the Turks had slowly granted Egypt increasing sovereignty 
over its own affairs, Britain centralized authority in the hands of its military governors. 
During the Great War, measures were introduced to redesign the Egyptian economy to 
serve the British war effort, while martial law eliminated a range of civil rights such as 
the freedoms of speech and assembly. These draconian policies drastically altered the 
nature of Egyptian political discourse, shifting it from a liberal ideological focus to a 
nationalist one. Joining in a united front against the British presence, both Christian and 
Muslim elites formed the Wafd party on the basis of creating a free and independent
1 TTEgypt. British attempts to undermine the party with the help of the Egyptian monarchy 
only fuelled the nationalist cause, as Sa’ad Zaghlul, the leader of the Wafd, became an 
anti-imperialist hero in the minds of many Egyptians.134
The colonial period therefore significantly changed the direction of Egyptian 
political discourse from one that focused on liberalism and the weakening of executive 
power to a centralized, ideologically based front against colonialism. The nationalist 
movement also relied heavily on the individual popularity of leaders like Sa’ad Zaghlul. 
Whereas before, 19th century intellectuals like al-Afghani and his disciples represented an
132 John Marlowe, Anglo-Egyptian Relations 1800-1956 (London: Frank Cass and Company Ltd, 1965), 
219.
133 Solihin, 7.
134 Marlowe, 275.
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indigenous push for an increasingly critical Egyptian populous, the nationalist movement 
gained political currency by focusing the attention of the country completely on their 
promise to eliminate the foreign threat.135 This ideology would centre on the idea of a 
strong charismatic leader who would be essential to the battle against imperialist 
interference. When the Free Officer’s Revolution was successful, the growing popularity 
for a strong personal authority figure was cemented in a new charismatic autocrat who 
would win self-determination for Egyptians. According to Claude Ake, this phenomenon
is not unusual, as charismatic leadership is a key characteristic in the transitional periods
• • • • • 1 ^of several post-colonial states as the country frees itself from imperial domination.
Both Zaghlul and Nasser would fill this role in the Egyptian political environment, 
shifting the direction of political discourse.
Clientelism Under Nasser
This charismatic authority would eventually evolve into the ideological 
cornerstone of Gamal Abdel Nasser’s presidency. Despite achieving independence from 
British interference, Nasser would insist that foreign control over key assets like the Suez 
Canal and the country’s agricultural land represented a new front for the Egyptian 
nationalist struggle.137 The president’s strong charisma further entrenched the public’s 
conception that the political environment demanded centralized authority in a strong 
leader, and Nasser would waste no time declaring a single national party to push forward
I  <30
the revolutionary changes would characterize his rule.
Hourani, 272.
136 Claude Ake, A Theory o f Political Integration (Homewood: The Dorsey Press, 1967), 52.
l37Kassem, 13.
138 Ibid., 51.
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Charismatic rule begins to degrade slowly after independence in all post colonial 
states, and new structures of authority must to be built in order to maintain the autocratic
1 "30structures created by the anti-colonial struggle. One of the most effective foundation to 
maintain control of the political sphere is the patron-client system. This was the case in 
Egypt, as a key clientelist bond was formed between the ruling party and the lower 
classes. Like many leaders in the developing world, Nasser harnessed working class 
frustration over land issues as part of his basis for his legitimacy.140 This allowed him to 
distract attention once more from questions over his regime’s lack of democracy through 
efforts to economically co-opt the population through land re-distribution laws (Before 
Nasser, the upper class held over 50% of agrarian land141). The expanding bureaucracy 
of the state and the focus on socialism allowed Nasser to bypass the traditional brokers of 
Egyptian society or futuwawat (typically local neighbourhood strongmen), and create a 
direct connection between the core and periphery.142
Another example of Nasser’s clientelist control can be examined via the state’s 
relationship with Al-Azhar University. One of the most respected Islamic institutions in 
the Sunni Muslim world, Al-Azhar was virtually incorporated as “an arm of the state”.143 
Older scholars were replaced by new ones trained during Nasser’s presidency as state 
funding increased the University’s budget four fold.144 Not surprisingly, religious 
rulings, or fatwas, began to consistently appear in support of the ruling parties policies.
140 Saad Eddin Ibrahim, Egypt. Islam and Democracy (Cairo: The American University o f  Cairo, 1996; 
reprint, 2002), 109.
141 Ibrahim, Egypt. Islam and Democracy. 112.
142 Eisenstadt and Roniger, Patrons. Clients and Friends. 133.
143 Tamir Moustafa, “Conflict and Cooperation between the State and Religious Institutions in 
Contemporary Egypt,” International Journal o f Middle East Studies Vol. 32, N o.l (Feb., 2000): 3.
144 Moustafa, 6.
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This was critically important, particularly as Nasser became increasingly criticized by 
Islamists in Saudi Arabia.145
Nasser’s death after decades of rule raised questions over the future of the 
country’s political direction. The clientelist authoritarian system, which owed its legacy 
and legitimized on Nasser’s personal popularity now seemed uncertain to survive under 
Vice President Anwar Sadat.
Clientelism Under Sadat
The survival of state authoritarianism required Sadat’s clientelist foundation to 
break away from Nasser’s in order to cement his own legitimacy. Starting with the 
undermining of political rivals like Ali Sabri and Muhammad Fawzi146, Sadat moved 
quickly to establish a new support base that would be loyal to his rule and not that of the 
late president.147 In order to establish his legitimacy, Sadat moved to establish new 
patron-client relationships by becoming allies with Nasser’s arch-rivals, the Muslim 
Brotherhood. Soon Sadat freed hundreds of Islamists from prison and began to establish 
himself as “the Believer President” of an Islamic society.148 Further measures ordered 
three thousand hours of state television to be dedicated to Islamic programming in 
attempt to further co-opt Muslim religious groups.149 Using Islam as an ideological 
foundation for legitimacy also allowed Sadat to later undermine secular opposition 
groups, especially the socialist Tagammu party, which Sadat continually accused of being 
communist agents of the Soviet Union.150 Since criticizing Islam would result in political
145 Ibid., 7.
146 Both Sabri and Fawzi were members of the military and close allies o f President Nasser. It quickly 
became clear their loyalty did not extend to the new president.
147 Kassem, 21.
148 Shatzmiller, 29.
149 Shatzmiller, 37.
150 Ibrahim, Egypt. Islam and Democracy. 46.
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suicide, many of these groups found they could not compete with the regime for political 
space.151 Sadat also pushed to gain outside support by pursuing policies which would 
legitimize his presidency with the West, such as expelling Soviet advisors in 1972, 
opening up the Egyptian economy in 1974, and beginning negotiations with Israel in 
1977.152
Clientelism Under Mubarak
Hosni Mubarak would enjoy an Egyptian political culture which had now largely 
accepted an authoritarian executive and the patron-client system as a political norm. That 
said, challenges still existed to the authoritarian structure. In his first term, Mubarak was 
confronted by a new multi-party system (which Sadat had introduced in 1977) and 
growing demands for change. In order to counter any challenges to his legitimacy, 
Mubarak made sweeping promises of political reform in 1984, including the pledge to
1 STstay in office for only two terms. Once his patron-client network was established 
however, Mubarak’s message soon shifted, arguing that democracy in the country would 
have to come in stages proportional to what Egyptians could absorb.154
The Mubarak regime also made strong use of their secular identity to maintain 
popularity. This major change from Sadat was the result of increasing violence 
perpetrated by radical Islamists groups which had broken away from the Brotherhood and 
began attacking state security forces, tourists and Egyptian Christians.155 After attacks on 
tourists saw the Egyptian economy lose over three billion dollars annually, Mubarak was
151 In the modem context, Islam continues to represent a hegemonic political symbol. Today however, the 
Islamic political identity is monopolized by the Muslim Brotherhood and not the ruling party. This is an 
important reason why the Brotherhood is so effective at surviving Mubarak’s attempts to undermine them.
152 Kassem, 23.
153 Ibid., 27.
154 Ibid., 79.
155 Ibrahim, Egypt. Islam and Democracy. 70.
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able to raise his popularity (and delay democratization indefinitely) under the guise of 
fighting a war against Islamic extremism.156 September 11th, 2001, allowed Mubarak to 
use this justification on more than the Egyptian populace, as the United States and other 
Western countries became quick to accept the regime’s claims that exceptional measures 
were needed to fight the War on Terrorism.157 Moreover, the regime has used fear of an 
extremist Islamic regime coming to power to convince many in Egypt, particularly 
Coptic Christians to support the proverbial ‘devil they know’ rather than tempt a shift to 
the status quo.158 In this way, Mubarak pushed to create his own ideological image as the 
secular, moderate strongman that stands firmly between the Egyptian people and Islamic 
radicalism.
Tactical Clientelism Within the Egyptian System
Now that the historical development and political ramifications of the patron- 
client system in Egypt have been established, focus will shift to describe the specific 
powers that the government has formed in order to monopolize control over Egypt’s 
political sphere. These controls will be broken down into several key areas which the 
ruling party uses to systematically reward clients and frustrate opposition.
The ruling party has used the clientelist system repeatedly to undermine its 
opposition. According to the Ibn Khaldun Center, Egypt has the most developed 
institutional infrastructure in the Arab world, one that is capable of sustaining full 
democracy.159 Many Egyptians however, choose to support the ruling National 
Democratic Party in order to access resources and build up their communities. This was
156 Ibid., 79.
157 Helmore and Jamal, 1.
158 Brewka and Jamal, 12.
159 Zaki, 23.
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a critical element in the 2000 parliamentary elections, as politicians needed to win voter 
trust in order to gain critical village loyalties for their campaigns.160 This focus on 
developing clientelist relationships with voters has had a degrading effect on debate 
within the National Assembly, as Egyptian political activity has begun to rotate entirely 
around politicians who endlessly seek to secure narrow campaign promises made to 
powerful individual supporters.161 In this type of relationship, the ruling party will have a 
decisive advantage over the opposition, as it alone has access to state resources and the 
ability to make credible promises. Once their patron has fulfilled their promises, the 
various authority groups, whether they be the primordial family or clan, business or 
religious authority, will not only accept their patron’s authority, but also work to make 
sure everyone under their own control gives allegiance to their new patron. According to 
Maye Kassem the clientelist bond “binds leaders and followers in a relationship not only 
of mutual assistance and support, but also recognized and accepted inequality between 
big men and lesser men...” The executive and the ruling NDP party therefore is able 
to establish its authority through the creation of these clientelist relationships which 
establish vertical power structures that permeate all levels of society.
The establishment of patron-client relations is therefore a key foundation of 
Egyptian authoritarian rule. By co-opting key support bases, the regime is able to tie its 
survival to its supporter’s advancement, giving them a personal stake in maintaining the 
status-quo. Even Egyptian political culture is shaped to depend on the ruling party’s 
continuing domination, as various authority groups within society conclude the only way 
to access state resources is through supporting the NDP.
160 Makram-Ebeid, 41.
161 Ouda, al-Borai and Abu Se’ada, 56.
162 Kassem, 4.
44
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
Constitutional Control
Constitutional change has been used since the presidency of Gamal Abdel Nasser 
to legitimize the executive’s political platform.163 Post-revolutionary Egypt has seen no 
less than seven constitutions, each often radically altering the political landscape of the 
country. For example, the 1958 Constitution eliminated parliament to prepare for 
Egypt’s short-lived union with Syria, while the 1964 document ordered half the seats in 
subsequent parliaments to be filled with “workers and peasants” to increase the chance of 
election victories for loyal civil servants.164 The current constitution was proclaimed on 
September 11th, 1971 and denotes considerable space laying out extraordinary control the 
executive authority enjoys over the state.165 An overview of the Constitution makes this 
imbalance clear, as sixty-three percent of powers are given to the presidency, while only 
twenty-five percent are awarded to the legislature and only two percent for the judiciary 
and cabinet respectively.166 Article 5 of the Constitution, designed to outline the balance 
of power between the branches of the state clearly illustrates the significant powers of the 
executive.167 They include, according to Article 112 and Article 147, the right of the 
executive to create and revoke legislation168, draft the state budget and unilaterally 
declare a state of emergency.169 The latter right was exercised in 1981 shortly after the 
assassination of President Anwar Sadat and has been used to increase executive authority
163 Ibid., 17.
164 Ibid., 18. Although argued to be an expression o f socialism, the idea o f guaranteeing “workers” in 
parliament was always problematic, if  not entirely disingenuous. The definition o f  “worker” was designed 
to maximize the amount of Presidential supporters in parliament.
165 Ouda, al-Borai and Abu Se’ada, 19.
166 Negad al-Borai, The Independence o f the Judiciary: The Truth As it Is! [research paper online] (Cairo: 
United Group, accessed 30 Dec. 2005); available from http://www.ug-law.com/eng/unitedgroup-post.pdf,
8 .
167 Ouda, al-Borai and Abu Se’ada, 19.
168 Ibid., 20.
169 Kassem, 24.
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ever since. These emergency laws are not only seen in Egypt but throughout the Arab 
world, and are a major criticism of the 2004 Arab Human Development Report.170 In 
Egypt, these measures include and are not limited to, restrictions on freedoms of 
mobility, assembly and residence, the increase of police search and arrest powers as well 
as the ability to bypass normal criminal courts.171 Furthermore, the emergency laws 
stipulate that the country’s opposition parties must provide notice of all activities to the 
Ministry of Interior, allowing the ruling NDP to interfere and disrupt campaign and 
organizing efforts.172 Finally, Egypt’s emergency laws also allow the president to arrest 
individuals without charge and hold them for forty-five days (this can be extended 
indefinitely173), a tactic used against many of Egypt’s estimated 12,000 to 15,000 
political prisoners.174
The executive’s control over the state is therefore legitimized in the nation’s basic 
law, protecting it from open legal challenges. Even more important however, it allows 
the executive multiple fronts on which to frustrate challengers, as opposition parties and 
even members of the other branches of government are faced with the realization that 
political change can rarely occur legally outside the approval of the president. 
Furthermore, no concrete steps have been taken by President Mubarak to fulfill his 
campaign pledge to end the use of the country’s emergency laws (renewed shortly before 
the 2005 election), a reform that would be tenuous at best, due to the President’s ability 
to renew the state of emergency at will.
170 Brewka and Jamal, 15.
171 Ouda, al-Borai and Abu Se’ada, 36.
172 Kassem, 56.
173 Ibid., 37.
174 Ibid., 37.
46
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
At least on one occasion, the executive has offered amendments to the 
constitution in order to appease its political clients. In 1971, President Anwar Sadat 
approved a motion to declare Islamic Shari 'ah “a” source of law in the Republic. Later 
in 1980, this article was amended again to state that Shari’ah would be “the” source of 
law for the constitution, further amassing the support of Islamists.175 Clearly however, 
this was an empty gesture on behalf of the state, as attempts by judges to use Shari ’ah in 
rulings have lead to their dismissal.176 Still, the ability to entice support through 
amendments to the country’s highest law is a key power of the executive.
Judicial and Parliamentary Controls
The constitutional powers granted to the executive allow it to control and 
influence much of the activities of the other two branches of the state. The executive’s 
influence then ties both branches into a reality in which they are politically or financially 
rewarded for supporting the status quo.
The President’s control over the parliament begins with the ability to directly 
appoint representatives to both houses of the Assembly. In the Maglis al-Sha’ab this 
only accounts for ten members, but the upper house (Maglis al-Shurah) presidential 
supporters receive a full one-third of the seats automatically.177 This creates a substantial 
bloc of parliamentarians whose political career rests entirely on supporting the 
executive’s policies. The President also controls the parliament with his ability to call 
the assembly to order and send it to recess at will. The parliament therefore can only 
meet at the pleasure of the executive branch, and cannot meet without its approval.178
175 Shatzmiller, 72.
176 Sami Zubaida, Law and Power in the Islamic World. (New York: I.B. Tarns, 2003; reprint, 2005), 170.
177 Ouda, al-Borai and Abu Se’ada,, 20.
178 al-Borai, The Independence o f the Judiciary. 6.
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The executive also creates the state budget, which the parliament (under Article 15 of the
■I 7 Q
Constitution) is not allowed to amend without Presidential permission. Unilateral 
control of the state’s budget gives the executive extraordinary power over the other 
branches, giving the president control over financial incentives which can used to co-opt 
various support bases, such as the military and the judiciary.180
The President’s NDP party has enjoyed, since the introduction of the multi-party 
system in 1977, a complete domination of the legislature. This is in large part due to the 
fact that the National Democratic Party has access to state resources in order to frustrate 
the opposition.181 Whereas the opposition parties find their political organization efforts 
hampered by the Ministry of the Interior, the NDP is free to promote its campaigns at 
will.182 In 1995, the popular (but officially banned) Muslim Brotherhood was only able to 
win one seat in parliament due to extreme state interference. Furthermore, access to 
state political/economic resources as well as contact with the executive allows individual 
NDP candidates the ability to make credible patrimonial promises to their supporters.184
Perhaps the most striking aspect of parliamentary dynamics in Egypt is that any 
critical remarks against the executive are technically illegal under Articles 98b, 102b and 
174 of the Penal Code. Such laws, strictly speaking, outlaw all political discourse 
which does not support the ruling party and can be used to quell opposition dissent in the 
parliament if necessary. Members of Parliament do enjoy legal protections, but immunity 
can be removed if the majority of the People’s Assembly vote in favour of the motion.
179 Ibid, 7.
180 The regimes relationship with both the judiciary and military will be examined later in this paper.
181 Makram-Ebeid, 33.
182 Kassem, 56.
183 Makram-Ebeid, 35.
184 Kassem, 56.
185 Ibid, 57.
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Since the ruling NDP has held the overwhelming majority in parliament since the current 
multi-party system was established, this gives them a key weapon against political
opponents. Such was the case when Islamist MP Sayid Fath al-Bab was stripped of his
186protections because of his work against the NDP in the lower house.
It is clear therefore that the state’s interference in the legislative process creates a
system in which opposition parties are powerless to gain political goals.187 While the
ruling NDP party has no trouble finding candidates to run in all districts, most secular
parties are unable to develop the manpower to ever seriously challenge the regime’s
majority. This is because running for the ruling party often results in access to state
resources; whereas running for the opposition is largely pursued for ideological purposes
and lacks opportunities for economic and professional advancement.
The judiciary also lacks independence from the executive, despite the claim by
the Constitution (Article 165, 166) of a strong separation of powers .188 First, the judicial
authority is divided among several institutions, forcing power to be dispersed, rather than
concentrated in the hands of a traditional judicial structure. The first parallel institution
1 80created by the executive for this purpose was the State Security Court, formed in 1964. 
These emergency courts, found all over the Arab region, are not only used to try those 
accused of military crimes, but also for civilian offenders.190 In Egypt, these special 
courts (legalized by Article 170 and 173 of the constitution191), began to charge political
186 Ibid., 32.
187 This generally is the case for the secular opposition, but political efforts by the Muslim Brotherhood can 
also be frustrated through state security systems.
188 Ouda, al-Borai and Abu Se’ada, 26.
189 Kassem, 19.
190 Brewka and Jamal, 91.
191 Ouda, 26.
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and Islamist opponents in 1992 and civilian offenders in 1995.192 Therefore, unlike 
military courts in the West, the regime can opt to bypass the normal judiciary and 
prosecute civilian defendants and in a court controlled by military officers.
In 1969, the second parallel judiciary was created in order to strengthen Nasser’s 
legitimacy after his defeat to the Israelis in the Six Days War.193 The Supreme 
Constitutional Court is, technically speaking, the most senior court in the country, but 
legal analysts argue that the constitution remains very vague as to whether it is part of the 
normal judiciary or not.194 If it remains outside of the normal judiciary, then 
constitutional protections regarding separation of powers do not apply. What is clear 
however, is that protections or not, the executive does control the SCC and its decisions. 
Each member is chosen by the executive, and the President himself has no restrictions on 
the choice of his appointee, making a promotion to the SCC a supreme act of patronage 
from the president to his closest supporters.195
The dominance of the regime over the SCC was clearly demonstrated when the 
Court finally ruled in 2000 on a ten year old case challenging the executive’s supervision 
of polling stations during national elections. The court ruled against the executive, but 
only because the President gave them permission to do so in an attempt to shore up his 
legitimacy after criticisms of the 1995 election.196 The fact that the executive can freeze a 
controversial ruling for ten years is testament to the reality that the SCC remains ready to 
carry out the task that it was created for, namely, the implement of the regime’s policies 
in a manner which builds legitimacy in the eyes of the Egyptian people.
192 Ibid., 25.
193 Kassem, 19.
194 Ouda, al-Borai and Abu Se’ada, 27.
195 al-Borai, The Independence o f the Judiciary. 16.
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Finally, the president also has power over the traditional judiciary as well, both by 
controlling their selection and the treasury from which their salaries are paid197 (the 
President also has the power to appoint and promote all of the country’s Public
|  QO
Prosecutors, giving the executive even more control over the legal system ). Moreover, 
according to Law 46 of 1972, the Ministry of Justice has the right to supervise the 
activities of all judges.199 From this, it controls the promotion and disciplinary actions 
which it can carry out unilaterally. For instance, laws enacted in 1972 and 1974 allow the 
executive to promote a judge to a higher circuit for as long as they deem necessary (in 
renewable six month terms).200 This tactic can also be used for the Public Prosecutors 
and creates a system by which the person in question remains permanently co-opted by 
the state. At any time the executive can demote the judge/lawyer back to his previous 
position, forcing the individual to continually seek to carry out the will of the regime. 
These temporary posts can be extremely lucrative, adding a powerful financial incentive 
to comply.201
The Ministry of Justice also controls the Judicial Inspectors Directorate, which is 
charged with disciplining and dismissing judges that are unfit for duty.202 This, like 
many other powers given to the executive, lacks safeguards to prevent it from being 
abused for political purposes. For instance, the Minister of Justice has the right to 
dismiss a judge for health reasons that compromise his ability to carry out his duties. 
This decision however, does not require confirmation by any medical institution.203
197 Ibid., 26.
198 al-Borai, The Independence o f the Judiciary. 24.
199 Ibid., 2.
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Moreover, Article 111 of Law 46 (1972) also allows the Ministry to dismiss any judge 
that is unfit for his position, offering the executive limitless excuses to remove judges 
that challenge their authority.204
The control over the parliament and judiciary adds further legal barriers to 
political change, as the executive works to create a system in which professional success 
in these institutions is tied directly to maintaining the status-quo. Challenging the 
government in any meaningful way would result in, at best, the closing of lucrative 
financial opportunities and an end to professional advancement. Serious challenges may 
very well result in disciplinary issues which can end a career outright.
Economic Control
Another effective tool in establishing state autonomy and authority is found in 
Egypt’s economic polices. One of the fundamental controls most citizens have over their 
state is the government’s reliance on taxation as a source of income. Compared to most 
developing countries however, Egypt relies disproportionately on external rents, allowing 
them to have greater economic autonomy from their citizenry.205 While the idea of rent 
traditionally is seen as a major factor only in the Gulf States, Egypt has its own major 
sources of rent, including oil, tourism, Suez Canal income, workers’ remittances and 
foreign aid. These sources of income by 1980 accounted for twenty-four percent of the 
country’s wealth, giving the state extraordinary autonomy from its citizens.206
1 U 1 U , 5 J  ' •
205 Richards and Waterbury, 17.
206 Paul Rivlin, “Egypt’s Demographic Challenges,” Middle East Review o f International Affairs Volume 
7, No. 4 (December 2003) [journal online] accessed on 1 January 2006, available from 
http://meria.idc.ac.il/joumal/2003/issue4/jv7n4a2.html.
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Government spending during the Post-Revolutionary period also drastically
• 907increased, from 18.5 percent of the country’s GDP in 1954 to 55.7 percent in 1970. 
Due to the constitutional controls the executive has over the state, the President continues
2QO .
to enjoy almost complete control over the distribution of this wealth. This 
monopolization of the state’s resources by the executive easily leads to corruption as the 
ruling party, unchecked, uses this wealth as tools for political patronage.209 Moreover, 
instead of using this income for structural reform programs, Egypt, like most Arab 
regimes, often spent the funds on grand public or social works projects in order to gain 
legitimacy from its citizens 210 Although key reforms were carried out during the 1990s, 
they were aided by massive debt relief given to Egypt as reward for its support during the 
Gulf War. For example, Egyptian political and military co-operation lead to pressure by 
America and several Gulf states on various institutions, causing many to forgive their 
loans. The Paris Club alone wrote off over 10.1 billion dollars of the Egyptian debt, 
making reforms much more manageable211 Despite this unprecedented assistance, 
Mubarak still remained cautious with serious economic reform, because structural
919readjustment would lead to a serious challenge of his presidency. In fact, the early 
nineties (when initial economic reforms were being taken), were some of the bloodiest in 
Egyptian history, with over 1,000 deaths.213 The violence was rooted in the disruption of
207 Owen, 24.
208 Eberhard Kienle, A Grand Delusion: Democracy and Economic Reform in Egypt (New York: I.B. 
Tauris Publishers, 2001), 24.
209 Celasun, xvii.
210 Richards and Waterbury, 214.
211 Rivlin, http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2003/issue4/jv7n4a2.html.
212 The Brotherhood found increasing support amongst the lower class as state subsidies weakened.
213 Ibrahim, Egypt. Islam and Democracy. 168.
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what Maye Kassem describes as the authoritarian “social contract” in which the state 
provides economic rights in return for worker class submission.214
State interference in the economy can also be felt in the massive state-owned 
enterprises which are found throughout Egypt. Through these corporations, authoritarian 
states can maintain control over their populations who now rely on the state, and not the 
private sector, for employment and basic services. This massive interference in economy 
has made the state completely indispensable, giving millions of people a direct economic 
interest in maintaining the political status quo.215
In all, the government of Egypt provides work for over twenty-five million people 
(35 percent of the population) through the civil service and various state owned 
enterprises. Moreover, SOEs, even after initial privatization efforts, still account for sixty 
percent of non-agricultural output.216 Controlling these industries is essential to 
maintaining authoritarian power, as any disintegration of Egyptian financial realities 
would result in widespread discontent and serious challenges to the regime’s authority.
The monopolization of the workforce by the state occurred shortly after 
independence, as the government set wages without reference to the private sector, 
attracting the most skilled workers to its industries.217 This policy was so successful that 
the decade after the revolution saw the bureaucracy grow from 350,000 workers to over
110
one million. By drawing the best professional minds away from the private sector, the 
Egyptian state was able to greatly increase in political authority and economic autonomy.
214 Kassem, 13.
215 Celasun, 26.
216 Ibid., 65.
217 Ibid., 70.
218 Owen, 24.
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The government presence in the workforce also increased as state institutions 
have made a concerted effort to lower unemployment by unnecessarily increasing the size 
of bureaucracy and SOEs. Besides being economically unsound, these programs make
910efforts to privatize companies (300 companies in 1991) extremely difficult, as 
responsible down-sizing often leads to unemployment and the types of violence 
mentioned above.220
The economic foundation of Egyptian authoritarianism is absolutely critical to the 
regime’s ability to monopolize the state’s political sphere. Mubarak’s tentativeness to 
continue the reforms which started in the early 1990s demonstrates a clear choice to 
continue the pursuit of personal power over the wellbeing of the Egyptian economy. 
That said, until those consequences manifest themselves, Mubarak and the NDP continue 
to maintain control of state resources and businesses, forcing Egyptians to have a 
powerful economic stake in the status quo.
Control over Civil Society
One of the strongest challenges to the ruling party has been Egyptian civil society. 
According to most experts, civil society challenges the authoritarian system because it 
consists of a plurality of actors each vying for their particular interests and place in the 
country’s political sphere. Civil society in Egypt has done much to disintegrate the 
parochial political culture within the country’s society that the regime relies upon to 
continue its patriarchal role.
The executive authority has typically challenged the growth of civil society by 
passing laws which tie its existence to ministries within the government. This was the
219 Ibrahim, Egypt. Islam and Democracy. 150.
220 The violence stems not merely from workers being unemployed, but also because o f ideas that 
guaranteed employment is part o f the patron-client relationship with the state.
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case with Nasser, whose presidency was threatened early on by the growing power of 
unions and labour groups within the country. To combat this, the executive passed
legislation (Law 32 of 1964) which allowed the government to dissolve any association
001which was not in line with “security measures”. Further labour laws attempted to
appease unions by pledging no dismissal without cause if unions did not engage in
strikes. Failure to accept this bargain was met with a swift military response, as a 1953
000strike in Imbaba lead to 300 arrests as tanks and soldiers moved to end the standoff.
Over time, Nasser began to deal with this problem by integrating the unions into 
the state apparatus. This was accomplished through the creation of the General 
Federation of Egyptian Trade Unions, a government umbrella association which would 
safeguard workers rights.223 This would allow the government to again have direct 
control over the various emerging labour groups.
Although human rights groups, such as the Partisan’s Association of Human 
Rights in Cairo/Alexandria developed during the 1970s, they simply acted as 
mouthpieces of government propaganda. It was not until 1987 that the Egyptian 
Organization for Human Rights became the country’s first independent NGO dedicated 
to monitoring state abuses of human rights. The work of the EOHR has done much to 
gain the disapproval of the regime which has never formally recognized the 
association.224 Although remaining outside the law allows the association more freedom 
from state control, it leaves it vulnerable to stiff legal penalties which the government can 
apply at will.
221 Kassem, 88.
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In 2003 the government implemented a new Associations Law (Law 84 of 2002) 
which maintains the government’s control over NGOs and civil society groups. The law 
forces the review of NGO registration by the Ministry of the Interior and security services
• • • 225and allows the President to dissolve any association at will by administrative order. 
The law also allows the government authority over who sits on an association’s board of 
directors, as well as giving it the power to interfere with funding.226 Legal recognition of 
non-governmental organizations and other civil associations therefore places groups at 
the mercy of the Ministry of Justice/Interior and the presidential authority. Fears of 
organizations having their activities frozen understandably restrict NGO willingness to 
deal with sensitive issues.
The regime also weakens civil society by placing pressure on individual leaders 
who challenge the executive’s authority. In March 2005, several government mosques 
used their Friday sermon to condemn human rights advocates such as Negad al-Borai and 
Saad Eddin Ibrahim as traitors to Egypt for their organization’s acceptance of foreign 
funding.227 Even more disturbing, on several occasions, supporters of the regime have 
moved to arrest and charge those who challenge the status quo. Quoting the 1996 Press 
Law which forbids journalist from engaging in slander, members of the Ministry of the 
Interior charged and imprisoned Magdi Ahmed Hussein, editor of al-Sha ’ab Newspaper, 
for a story which claimed the Minister’s son had used his father’s position as leverage in
225 “Egypt: Civil Society Groups Severely Restricted,” Human Rights Watch 4 July 2005 (accessed on 2 
January 2006); available from http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/07/04/egyptl 1217.htm.
226 “Egypt: Civil Society Groups Severely Restricted,” Human Rights Watch.
227 “Egypt: Margins o f Repression; State Limits on Nongovernmental Organization Activism,” Human 
Rights Watch July 2005 (accessed on 2 January 2006); available from 
http://hrw.org/reports/2005/egypt0705/index.htm.
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several key business deals.228 Other reformers, like the aforementioned Sa’ad Eddin 
Ibrahim and politician Ayman Nour have both spent time in prison for their reform 
activities. Moreover, Amnesty International has documented several cases in which non-
99Qviolent civilian activists were tried within emergency military courts. The regime also 
takes a heavy handed approach to protests as well, as a four month long non-violent 
demonstration by Sudanese citizens seeking asylum in Mohandessin (Cairo) was brutally 
broken up by security forces officers in December 2005, leading to the death of over 
twenty individuals.230
Legal restrictions as well as tacit and overt threats of force are used to contain 
Egypt’s civil society from seriously challenging the regime directly. Although NGOs 
have done much to politicize civil actors to challenge the executive’s monopoly, little can 
be done to directly remove the ruling parties control over Egypt’s political environment. 
Monopolization o f the Tools o f Force
Critical to any authoritarian system is its ability to use overwhelming force to 
maintain its rule against what it cannot control through the other foundations of the 
regime’s power. While the dynamics listed above frustrate traditional avenues of reform, 
only a disproportionately powerful state security apparatus can contain attempts to 
achieve change through more radical means. That said, the Egyptian state, under 
President Mubarak, has also used the military to during election periods to contain legal 
challenges to his party’s rule.
228 “Egypt: Muzzling Civil Society,” Amnesty International 19 September 2000 (accessed on 2 January 
2006); available from http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGMDE120212000.
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230 “Cairo Violence Toll Rises to 27,” BBC News Online 2 January 2006 (accessed on 2 January 2006); 
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According to Roger Owen, it is essential for the authoritarian state to “destroy 
what it cannot control.”231 During the presidency of Gamal Abdul Nasser, the regime 
targeted its opponents with ruthless efficiency in the name of the revolution. Islamist
232groups like the Muslim Brotherhood found themselves swept away through force as 
the country adopted secular socialism as a guiding principle. Sadat originally attempted 
to use Nasser’s Islamists opponents as allies for his regime, but growing radicalism and 
outspoken condemnation for the president’s peace deal with Israel led to a massive
233crackdown by security forces resulting in over 1,500 arrests in the late 1980s.
Mubarak’s presidency would mark a full confrontation between the state and 
Islamic radical groups. Despite Sadat’s efforts before his assassination, Islamist leaders 
and groups had sought to use force in order to carve out space for their authority within 
the Egyptian political sphere. For example, during the 1980s, an Islamist leader named 
Shaykh Gaber moved his supporters into a desperately poor Cairo neighbourhood near 
Imbaba and claimed the area as his own. The state, alerted by an embarrassing Reuter’s 
report moved in with 12,000 police to engage in a three week battle that left over six
O'XAhundred arrests and casualties. Thousands of political prisoners were taken throughout 
the country, as radical imams were forced under house arrest or even had their mosques 
surrounded by police on Fridays.235 These restrictions, combined with economic 
hardships felt during IMF restructuring, lead to a sharp increase in violence and 
repression by the state, resulting in the death of 1,164 people from 1990-1993.236
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Mubarak continually uses state security to obtain political victories for the NDP 
party during parliamentary elections. During 1995, corruption was rampant, with 
supporters of the ruling party being allowed to stuff ballot boxes while the opposition was 
refused entry.237 Although the state pledged to end these policies in the 2000 elections, 
police still prevented opposition supporters from entering polling stations in key districts 
while plain clothed agents caused disturbances amongst those waiting to vote, giving 
police an excuse to interfere.238 Independent judicial supervisors were powerless to stop 
what happened outside the stations, which the law clearly stipulated was the limit of their 
jurisdiction.239
The lead up to parliamentary elections in 2005 did lead many to seriously 
question whether the regime would truly live up to its renewed pledge to stay neutral 
during the campaign, as police forces allowed the Muslim Brotherhood enormous 
freedoms to organize.240 These hopes disintegrated however, as impressive victories by 
the Brotherhood during initial rounds of the elections lead to massive disruptions by 
security forces in the second and third stage. The tactics used by the police remained 
consistent with the two previous parliamentary elections, with opposition supporters 
being refused entry to the polling stations of key districts.241
The state often uses fears of terrorism to justify its security measures. This was 
especially true during the struggle against radical Islamists groups during the 1990s, as 
laws pushed to expand the definition of terrorism to allow the President more options in
237 Ouda, al-Borai and Abu Se’ada, 50.
238 Kassem, 60.
239 Ouda, al-Borai and Abu Se’ada, 50.
240 Amira Howeidy, “Egypt’s Brotherhood Takes Center Stage,” A1 Jazeera Online 14 November 2005 
(accessed 5 November 2005); available from http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/DD81F58B-4247- 
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60
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
dealing with resistance.242 After September 11, 2001, these arguments were met with 
increasing approval from Egypt’s Western allies who have encouraged the regime to use 
whatever efforts are necessary to win the global “War on Terror”.243 By strengthening 
one of the authoritarian foundations of power, international agents have given additional 
space for military responses against those seeking change within the Egyptian system, 
whether through radical or democratic means.
Since the revolution, the Egyptian executive authority has moved to monopolize 
the country’s political sphere by assuming control over any avenue in which reform could 
legally take place and using this position to co-opt challenges. The patron-client 
relationship therefore allows the regime to have the space to progress or regress on issues 
like political or economic reform unilaterally, taking whatever measures are needed to 
ensure its hold on power at any given time. The state also uses the threat of force to quell 
groups which do not respond to conventional pressure. These factors immobilize 
political change and create longstanding social realities which internalize the legitimacy 
of authoritarian rule. Over time, these parochial attitudes become a serious societal 
barrier to change and can develop into overt hostility against actors challenging the status 
quo.
242 Ibrahim, Egypt. Islam and Democracy. 155.
243 Helmore and Jamal, 1.
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C h a p t e r  F o u r : I s l a m  a n d  T h e  I m p a c t  o f  C o p t i c  M e n t a l i t i e s  o f
V u l n e r a b il it y
One of the minimum demands for any group is a subsistent livelihood and 
physical security.244 Protection from external threats has therefore represented a key 
foundation for many social structures and exchange relationships throughout history. 
Perhaps the best example of this would be the feudal system of medieval Europe.245 For 
several centuries, these institutions would see that communities that pledged their 
resources to the military elite received protection from the various lords whose vassals 
maintained the collective order of the region.
The clientelist system differs with the feudal system in many ways, but it does 
share physical security as a critically important resource. If a patron cannot prevent 
violence against its client, that individual or group will often cease participation in the 
exchange. At the same time however, the loss of a client’s mentality of vulnerability will 
also result in the destabilization of the clientelist relationship. This is due to the fact that 
the level of client’s perceived vulnerability largely determines the extent to which they 
will conform to their patron’s goals.246 Put another way, the greater the sense of strength 
of the client, the less of a need for a patron and greater the decline in the legitimacy of a 
clientelist bond.247
These two opposing factors create a dynamic by which the most effective 
environment for a clientelist relationship is one with a strong sense of perceived 
vulnerability. That is to say, in a reality where widespread violence seems present in a
244 Schmidt, et al., 440.
245 Ibid., 443.
246 Clapham, 12.
247 Ibid., 17.
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latent form. This is once more because exposure to prolonged manifest hostility would 
call into question the effectiveness of the patron’s power.
Since the Muslim conquest of Egypt, Christianity has slowly become a religious 
minority in the region. Despite commonly held perceptions, this encounter was largely a 
peaceful and tolerant relationship, particularly within the context of historical norms 
which dominated this era.248 Despite the comparatively high level of religious 
acceptance however, several key periods of persecution did manifest themselves 
intermittently, creating varying degrees of perceived vulnerability. These periods will 
now be explored in order to describe the foundation on which this study argues a 
perceived mentality of Coptic vulnerability exists.
It is important to differentiate however, between these eras as representatives of 
sporadic periods of history, and longstanding social norms and religious ideals. In 
particular, misconceptions are often formed around the fallacy that Islam promotes the 
forceful conversion and persecution of Christianity. In reality, Islamic ideals constructed 
an environment which was significantly tolerant for the period. The Prophet 
Muhammad’s teachings/examples with regards to dhimmis249 are actually quite 
systematic, especially considering that many other important issues, including the nature 
of leadership succession, remained unexplored by his teachings. This was perhaps 
because the issue of relations with the dhimmis were of critical importance during his 
lifetime, particularly with Jewish tribes living near the city of Medina. When Muslims 
arrived in the area after fleeing persecution in Mecca, they immediately opened 
negotiations with nearby Jewish tribes. The conclusions of these discussions and
248 Meinardus, 64.
249 The term dhimmis can be described as a protected minority that exists within the Islamic community 
under a formalized framework with the Muslim authority.
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negotiations resulted in what is popularly termed by scholars as the ‘Constitution of 
Medina’. This document (in articles 24-35, 37, 38 and 46) states that “The Jews of 
various groups belong to the community, and are to retain their own religion; they and the 
Muslims are to render ‘help’ (including military aid) to one another when it is needed.” 
Severe warnings were then made through the hadith of the Prophet towards Muslims who
A f  1
would seek to mistreat minorities under Islam’s protection. “Beware whoever is cruel 
and hard on such people [dhimmis] or curtail their rights, or burden them with more than 
they can endure, or realize anything from them against their free will, I myself will be a 
complainant against him on the Day of Judgement.” Although the idea of a tax for 
non-Muslims was recognized, it was to be strictly within their means and only to replace 
the contributions to society that Muslims made with the zakat, the mandatory charity paid
9^ 9by believers each year.
The Prophet’s positive views on the Coptic Christians are also well documented, 
first with his marriage to the Copt Mariyah Qibtiyyah, and second, with his agreement 
with the Christian monks of the St. Katherine’s Monastery in Sinai, signed in the year 6 
A.H.254 This agreement stipulated that no Christian cleric would be driven out of Egypt, 
no monk forced from his monastery, no pilgrim detained from pilgrimage, no churches 
converted or destroyed; no Christian compelled to reject his religion and no forcible 
conversion for woman who married Muslims. Speaking of the Copts in general,
251 The hadith represent collected volumes o f sayings attributed to the Prophet Muhammad by his 
companions.
252 Mawdudi, 8.
253 Ibid., 11.
254 The Muslim lunar calendar begins with the hijra, or exodus o f Muslims from Mecca to Medina in 622 
A.D.
255 Doi, 76.
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Muhammad is reported to have said to his followers “when you conquer Egypt, be kind
'y r  /
to the Copts...for they are your kith and kin.”
The conquest of Egypt in 641 A.D. by Amr Ibn al-‘As and his four thousand 
cavalry was at first a positive experience for the Coptic Christians, as it freed them from 
brutal persecution from Constantinople.257 In fact, when Byzantine forces attempted to 
retake Egypt in 645-646, the Christian population actively aided Muslim forces in the 
territory’s defence.258 Initially, a liberal policy towards religion was taken and the 
indigenous Christians saw little significant change in their daily lives. The Coptic 
Church, considered heretical by the Roman Empire, saw a distinct renaissance in both its 
literature and tradition under early Islamic rule, as it no longer had to remain hidden from 
foreign oppression.260 Positive treatment of the dhimmis in Egypt seemed to have been of 
considerable concern to the Muslims, as evidence exists of Caliph Umar writing a 
strongly worded letter to Amr and his Egyptian garrison for chastising Christians during a 
public event. In the letter, Umar writes, “since when have you enslaved a people, oh
J/T1
Amr, when their mothers had given birth to them in freedom?” Moreover on an 
economic level, imperial taxes for non-Muslims, called the jizyah, were at first much less 
than taxes under Byzantine rule.
To state that the Muslim conquest of Egypt and the institution of the dhimmis 
framework was an entirely positive experience for Coptic Christians would, however, be
256 C ragg, 173.
257 This will be explored in detail within Chapter Five.
258 E.J. Chitham, The Coptic Community in Egypt: Spatial and Social Change (Durham: Centre for Middle 
East and Islamic Studies, 1986), 56
259 Vatikiotis,12.
260 Richard Fletcher, The Crescent and the Cross: The Dramatic Story o f the Earliest Encounters between 
Christians and Muslims. (New York: Penguin Books, 2003), 40.
261 Mossa, 188.
262 Chitham, 56.
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a mistake. Living under an authority which held a differing religious creed as a primary 
social identity eventually would lead to periods of persecution of Christians under the 
rule of various Muslim authorities. No matter how intermitted these persecutions 
occurred, they created a strong historical mentality of vulnerability which still has an 
impact on the current political system. Despite commands for tolerance against dhimmis 
described above, the rule of Caliph Umar was not always a positive experience for 
Christians. The Caliph’s agreement with the Christians of Jerusalem -  often described as 
the ‘Pact of Umar’ -  would be a curious departure from Muhammad’s Constitution of 
Medina and would leave a comparatively stricter legacy for how Muslims should treat 
Christians. The Pact discussed how Christians had to refrain from speaking against Islam 
as well as from publicly proselytizing their religion. Crosses, public processions and the 
ringing of church bells was also discouraged in this agreement, essentially turning 
Christian worship into a private activity only. These rules also set specific dress for non- 
Muslims and stipulated that they would have to ride donkeys or mules, not horses. The 
building of new churches became extremely difficult as well, a trend that would become 
a significant problem for the Coptic Christians in Egypt right up to the modem era.264 
According to Robert Brenton Betts, “the dhimmis system, while allowing the Heterodox 
Christians to keep their religion, churches, and property, and to live according to the 
cannon laws of their particular sect, condemned them in effect to a slow but almost
' J fL C
inevitable decline and death.” Put precisely, although the Coptic Church was freed 
from direct persecution from the Roman Empire and allowed to pursue whatever beliefs
263 Bruce Masters, Christians and Jews in the Ottoman World: The Roots o f  Sectarianism (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 22.
264 Fletcher, 21.
265 Betts, 9.
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it wished, the dhimmis system would weaken the Church in the long term, first by 
removing it from the greater Christian world and by undermining its ability to spread. At 
the same time, the dhimmis system resulted in realities which favoured conversion to 
Islam, a trend that would increase over time. As more and more Arabs moved into 
Egypt, they intermarried with the Coptic population, slowly transforming the society 
linguistically and religiously.
Not surprisingly, violence broke out as the reality of the dhimmis system set in, 
especially when various Muslim rulers moved away from the strict guidelines set down 
by Muhammad’s teachings. This was the case during the rule of Caliph Yazid, whose 
efforts to remove Christian icons from Egypt resulted in a massive revolt against the 
dhimmis system in the mid-eight century A.D. Other riots would eventually break out 
over taxation, each brutally suppressed.267 In the Nile Delta, no less than three full scale 
revolts took place between 722 and 767 AD. In the south, where the Christian population 
was concentrated, a major insurrection broke out in 782 AD. A final revolt would be 
organized in 829 near the city of Hawf, and, like the previous rebellions, Muslim 
retaliation was swift and brutal.268 This is significant, because moments of intolerance 
would act as a formative experience for internalized norms held by both the Coptic 
Christians and Muslims.
The Fatmid Dynasty would, for the most part, pursued a policy encouraging a 
tolerant relationship with the Coptic Christian community. There is however, the notable 
exception of the Caliph al-Hakim, who would, between 1012 and 1015, introduce
266 Vatikiotis, 14.
267Christian Cannuyer, Coptic Egypt: The Christians o f the Nile (New York: Harry N. Abrams Inc., 2001), 
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widespread persecution towards Coptic Christians and expel them from official 
positions.269 Claiming he was a divine manifestation of God270, Hakim ordered all 
Christians to be forced to wear a five pound cross around their necks (which often lead to 
serious strain and injuries), wear dark clothes and be tattooed.271 Reviving the Pact of 
Umar, Coptic Christians were again forced to only ride donkeys272 and many escaped into 
the country’s rural areas as the Caliph ordered the destruction of over three thousand 
churches.273 Although al-Hakim is largely viewed by scholars as an anomaly (evidence 
points to him being clinically insane274), his actions serve as further evidence that not all 
Islamic rulers would follow the theoretically liberal guidelines set down by Muhammad 
and the early Muslims towards the dhimmis.
The Mamluk Sultanate would however, provide a sustained example of Muslim 
persecution towards Coptic Christians. Riots, encouraged by virulent anti-Christian 
rhetoric would push the sectarian tensions in Egypt to the limit 275 Much of this 
animosity would stem from suspicion the Sultanate had over Christian loyalty during the 
Crusades.276 Period literature began to criticize Christians who “assume a proud 
bearing”, with one preacher describing Coptic Christians as “the source of all misfortune 
and treason.”277 Later, stories emerged about how Christians in Syria sprinkled Muslims 
with wine after the 13th Century Mongol conquest of Baghdad, while chanting the
269 Meinardus, 65.
270 Barbara Watterson, Coptic Egypt (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1988), 156.
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supremacy of Christ.278 Under these conditions, simple actions by Christians, including 
church repairs, would result in significant discontent amongst Egyptian Muslims. 
Evidence shows that, on one occasion, the promotion of Christian scribes by the Sultan 
resulted in widespread riots and the destruction of churches in both Cairo and Alexandria. 
In response to the violence, the Sultan doubled the required jizya tax that year.
During the Bahri Mamluk era, there are several examples periods of sustained 
campaigns against the dhimmis. One campaign, in 1293 A.D., began when Muslims 
observed a Christian leading a Muslim debtor around the city by a rope. In response, the 
Sultan removed all Christians from his service and ordered churches and Christian homes 
to be attacked and looted 280 Ten years later, the Sultan Nasir Muhammad began to 
persecute Christians because an ambassador from the Maghrib (present day Morocco) 
was alarmed at how proud the Coptic Christians were during his tour of Cairo. In his 
land, he argued, Christians “suffer extreme misery and degradation”. Immediately, new 
laws were passed forcing Christians to wear distinct clothing, once more ride only 
donkeys, and be forbidden to repair churches. Worst of all, sectarian relations were dealt 
another blow by laws which made fraternizing illegal between Christians and Muslims.281 
Even Copts that converted were subject to continual discrimination, as the Muslim 
community argued their conversion was due entirely upon a desire for power.282 By the 
16th Century, Christian payment of the jizyah would evolve into a highly public lesson in 
humiliation.283
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The period between the French invasion under Napoleon and the 1952 Revolution 
was a mixed period for the Coptic Christians. Contrary to expectations, it was the 
Egyptians themselves that began to increasingly demand Coptic participation in the 
bureaucracy, eventually passing laws declaring non-Muslims as full citizens. Colonial 
regimes, as shall be demonstrated in the following section, largely exacerbated sectarian 
tensions and hostility against the Copts.
The landing of French forces in Egypt in the late 18 Century increased Muslim 
suspicion of the Copts just as it had during the period of the Crusades. Many within the 
Ottoman Empire argued that the Coptic Christians should be killed for presenting a “fifth 
column” in the Empire.284 This mentality was only eased after significant efforts were 
taken to demonstrate the French were not invading under the auspices of Christianity.
Christian participation would increase under Muhammad Ali and his descendants, 
who, in the late 19th Century, began to shift towards the political environment towards an 
Egyptian national identity which transcended religion.285 Ali would push to take 
advantage of Coptic Christian bureaucrats and advisors, while his descendants abolished 
the jizyah and allowed non-Muslims to join the army. Granting Christians prestigious 
positions remained controversial, even precarious at first, as traditionally these positions 
were given to Muslims.287 The Khedives could carry out these reforms however, because 
they held on to the legitimacy of being the first truly Egyptian rulers since antiquity. 288
284 Meinardus, 66.
285 Muhammad Ali was originally the regional authority placed in charge o f Egypt by the Ottoman 
Sultanate, before increasingly pushing for autonomy from the Empire.
286 Van Doom-Harder and Vogt, 10, 24.
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For the first time in centuries, the Christians of Egypt were removed from the dhimmis 
system and its ideological descendants and free to participate in mainstream politics.
Later, under the British, Copts were once again faced with discrimination. The 
British were acutely aware of the fact that the Coptic Christians were again being called 
collaborators with a foreign power, and countered the rise of animosity by not placing 
Christians in prominent positions.289 In fact, British efforts to assure Muslims the best 
positions in the bureaucracy led Copts to form protests councils, such as the in the one 
held in Asyut in 1910. Their complaints included the desire to have Sunday made a 
holiday and the opening of more positions to Christians, including more seats on 
provisional councils.290 Eventually, frustration with British rule would lead to Copts 
joining with Muslims in nationalist movements committed to put “Egypt First”. 291 
Participation with secular nationalist parties like the Wafd saw Coptic Christians enjoy 
increasing representation in the National Assembly (including elections in 1924, 1928, 
1936 and 1942).292
A new sense of vulnerability would be created however with the growth of 
Islamist movements in Egypt. Tensions had already begun to mount over the perception 
of Coptic control in the Wafd movement. This was encouraged by the rhetoric of 
opposition political parties like the Liberal Constitutionalists who began to attack the 
Wafd using religion. Although secular nationalists as well, the Liberal Constitutionalists 
argued that the Wafd was trying to hide the fact that it was a Coptic Christian party from 
the Muslim populace. Drawing off Nazi propaganda, the Liberal Constitutionalists
289 Hasan, 35.
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291 Vatikiotis, 208.
292 Hasan, 40.
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would use the same rhetoric that Hitler used against the Jews to weaken the Wafd and 
their Christian supporters.293 Arguments that the Coptic Christians were trying to create 
their own state increased pressures for the Wafd separate itself from Christian support. 
This was heightened as attacks against churches began to intensify in 1946.294
The ideal of a joint secular Egyptian identity was also strained by the pressure of 
Hasan al-Banna and the Muslim Brotherhood. Arguing a full return to the tenets of an 
Islamic state, al-Banna described how “Voices are raised proclaiming the necessity to 
return to these [Islamic] principles, teachings and ways of Islam...for initiating the 
reconciliation of modem life with these principles, as a prelude to final Tslamization”’.295 
Al-Banna called for the return to Islamic shari’ah as the basis for Egyptian law and 
described how secularization was the root cause of weakening in the Arab world.296 Not 
surprisingly, Egyptian Christians reacted to this development with a great deal of 
suspicion, fearing that revived Islamist political groups would push towards a new Pact of 
Umar and a neo-dhimmis system.297 That said, throughout his lifetime, al-Banna argued 
that Christians would remain full citizens of an Islamic state, and even included a Copt on 
his Bureau of Muslim Brothers.298 This concept of tolerance remains the official line of 
the Muslim Brotherhood to this day, which, according to senior party member Essam al- 
Erien, is committed to opening up a “political space” for Christians within the Egyptian 
state.299 In fact, an entire section of the Brotherhood’s ‘Reform Initiative’ which was
293 H asan, 49.
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released during the 2005 elections dealt with relations with their “Coptic Brothers”, and 
lists the following principles:
i) Copts are a part of the fabric of the Egyptian society.
They are partners of the nation and destiny. Our rights are 
theirs, our duties are theirs.
ii) Freedom of belief and worship for all is respected.
Cooperation that serves the society and is in the best 
interest of citizens is an obligation for all.
iii) Keenness on the brotherhood spirit that has been linking 
all Egyptians (Muslims and Copts) for centuries, spreading 
the foundations of love and harmony among them, so as to 
enable the nation to work comprehensively for building the 
future.
iv) Emphasising national unity, not allowing any activity 
that leads to inciting feelings of religious sedition or ethnic 
fanaticism among Egyptians.300
Despite these positive ideologies, it is important to remember that mentalities of 
vulnerability can develop over what is perceived to be a threat, even if in reality that 
threat is not legitimately there. That said, the concern by Christians over Islamist 
movements is not entirely irrational. This is largely due to divisions which existed in 
Islamists movement from the beginning. Although al-Banna believed Coptic Christians 
should have full citizenship, Sayyid Qutb and other more radical brothers disagreed 
strongly.301 Early in the group’s development, popular slogans included “Our Religion 
and not Two Religions/No Cross After Now!”, while others alluded to the anti-Zionist 
movements being a prelude to an assault on Christianity, “Today is Saturday/ Tomorrow 
is Sunday”.302 Brotherhood criticism of Copts also targeted their assumed connection to 
colonial authorities, often saying foreign influences had corrupted the Christian
300 Muslim Brotherhood, Muslim Brotherhood Initiative; On the General Principles o f  Reform in Egypt 
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community. Although it can be argued that the party does not control all of its 
members, it is reasonable to assume that they alone would shape the message being 
presented in their official newspaper al-Dawah. Unfortunately, this too has often been 
highly inflammatory towards Coptic Christians, especially during the 1970s.304 During 
this period, al-Dawah described Egypt as a paradise for Coptic Christians, placing blame 
for sectarian violence on Pope Shenuda. The paper routinely accused the patriarch of 
undermining Egyptian solidarity, included culling “militant monks” and the constant use 
of aid from foreign elements that sought to interfere in the country’s domestic affairs.
Extremist off-shoots of the Brotherhood have made the situation even more 
problematic and inflammatory. Although the mainstream Brotherhood does not believe 
in the use of violence towards revolutionary Islamization, others, like Tanzim al-Jihad, 
have pushed to overthrow the government with a radical Islamic regime. These groups 
are extremely hostile to the Coptic Christians, and argue their traditional protected status 
under the dhimmis system has been withdrawn because of their efforts to undermine a 
return to an Islamic state. This and other Islamist extremist groups maintain that along 
with communists and Zionists, Christians in Egypt must all be killed.306
In response to the perceived Islamist threat and the monopolization of political 
power under Nasser after the Revolution, the Coptic community began to organize 
around insular institutions created by the Church. Although the specifics of this 
movement will be discussed in the following chapter, the following paragraphs will
303 Watterson, 175.
304 Hasan, 107.
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outline President Sadat’s response to what was perceived as a threat to presidential 
authority. Sadat’s policies maximized the Coptic mentality of vulnerability and would 
represent, according to this study, a key factor for the later establishment of a clientelist 
relationship under President Mubarak.
Sadat maximized Coptic vulnerability in several ways. First, as mentioned 
previously, successful efforts were made to pass constitutional amendments to make 
shari ’ah law the foundation for the state’s legal code. In 1971, this resulted in Clause 
Two being changed to read that “Islam is the religion of the state” and that shari ’ah was 
“a principle” source of legislation. By 1980, this was again amended, this time to
-1 A-}
describe shari ’ah as “the principle” source of legislation. This resulted in a series of 
efforts throughout the 1970s in which the Egyptian legislature debated over how to
TORcodify shari'ah into law. In response to Coptic Christians’ uproar about the renewed 
emphasis on religion, Sadat responded in his famous speech that all Egyptians should 
realize he is the “Muslim President of an Islamic State”.309
The second way in which Sadat contributed to Christian perceptions of 
vulnerability was to support various Islamists groups, even when they openly described
• • • Tinthe Coptic Christians as being an impediment to the creation of an Islamic state. 
Groups were now allowed to organize and infiltrate Egyptian universities, gaining the 
support of a new generation of youth. Islamist programming eventually became a major 
segment on Egyptian television (while Copts were limited to a broadcast on Easter) as 
discriminatory passages began to appear in the official school curriculum arguing that
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Islam is a superior religion.311 Perhaps most disturbingly, increasing evidence began to 
mount to suggest the public school system was tacitly encouraging Christian students to
• • T 1 “7convert religions.
The third factor in Sadat’s move to challenge the Church came from his
unwarranted rhetoric of the Coptic clergy representing a separatist movement within
Egypt. Rhetoric of Christians mobilizing to break away in Asyut or Alexandria became
popular, as well as ideas that monks were stockpiling weapons in monasteries. Sadat
himself argued in a speech in 1980 that the Pope was turning his community into a “fifth
column”. One year later, in front of the National Assembly, Sadat described how
Christians were working with Lebanese Phalange and taking money from West Germany
to violently create their own state.314 Attacks on Coptic Christians that followed were
ignored by the President, who continually blamed outsiders for terrorism. In one case in
•  ^1 ^1980, attacks on several churches in the country were blamed on an “Iranian spy”. 
Finally, in an act meant clearly to instil a sense of vulnerability in the Church, Sadat 
placed Pope Shenuda and over 170 clergy under house arrest. Pope Shenuda would
i i / r
remain in custody until he was released by President Mubarak in 1985.
The mentality of vulnerability was also greatly enhanced by extremist violence 
which targeted Christians during Sadat’s presidency. Repeated attacks against the Coptic 
Christian community began increasing in frequency during the debate over placing 
shari ’ah in the constitution began in 1971. For example, only a year after the amendment
311 Ibid., 171,173.
312 Informal interview with Negad al-Borai, Director of the Group for Democratic Development. (Cairo, 
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was passed, a Coptic church was stoned, then set ablaze after Muslims learned of a priest 
whose healing “miracles” had convinced over three hundred Egyptians to convert to 
Christianity.317 In November 1972, fighting broke out in the village of Khanka (near 
Cairo), over plans to use a private home as a chapel. By the end of the skirmish, the 
building in which the chapel was planned had been completely razed to the ground. 
Clergy sent by the Church to investigate the incident started more riots, resulting in 
Christian shops and homes being looted throughout the village.318 1977 saw a priest 
murdered by Muslims in the town of Tewfikya, while 1978-79 would see the Church of 
Abu Zaabal (Cairo) and the historic Church of the Virgin (al-Damshriyya) burned down 
by arsonists.319 1980 saw a significant wave of Church burnings in Minya and Firkria as 
well as a bombing campaign against Christian sites across the country (particularly 
Alexandria).320 Finally, in 1981, Muslim protests over a proposed Church resulted in the 
murder of Christians in Zawya al-Hamra.321
Under President Hosni Mubarak, the shift to the system of a more balanced 
vulnerability described in the opening paragraphs of this chapter is seen to develop. This 
of course, is necessary in order to maintain a mentality which supports the continuation 
of the clientelist relationship with the clergy that formed during his presidency. It is clear 
however that after two decades of Mubarak’s rule, the hostile rhetoric which existed 
between the ruling party and the Coptic Church is no longer present. That said, 
according to Gasser Abdel-Razek of the Egyptian Organization of Human Rights, 
concrete positive human rights reforms have been largely superficial (such as the
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declaration of Coptic Christmas as a holiday) while substantial reforms are delayed 
(particularly the Church Permit Law which remains based on a 140 year old Ottoman 
Decree that demands the Coptic Church to get government permission to build or repair a 
church).322 Although the government had officially ceased directed criticism of the 
Coptic Christians, it has not moved to eliminate the roots of intolerance themselves.323
Moreover, although the personal relationship between President Mubarak and 
Pope Shenuda has improved greatly, little serious effort has been made to heal the 
mentality of vulnerability which grew greatly under Sadat.324 Coptic Christians remain 
marginalized in Egyptian politics, with low representation in parliament, cabinet, 
university administrations and governorships.325 Even discrimination in the media (TV, 
movies) as well as within the school curriculum have remained.326 One example of this 
was a television serial or musalsal which was aired in February 1990. Based on 
sensationalized reports of Copts running pornography/drug rings with Muslim women 
(reports that were eventually proven to be invented by a 19 year old Muslim girl after 
being discovered in a relationship with a Coptic man), this serial would inspire violence 
to break out in Upper Egypt.327
Under Mubarak (though without the support that was seen during Sadat), Islamist 
parties and organizations quickly monopolized student unions and organizations on
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several university campuses.328 Islamic NGOs, pursuing a message of social justice, 
moved to monopolize Egyptian civil society, and now represent over eight thousand of 
the country’s fourteen thousand volunteer organizations.329 Islamist groups have 
thoroughly infiltrated the education system, causing the Minister of Education to report in 
1994 that students were being taught “not to salute the flag, sing the national anthem or 
talk or study with Christian students”.330 Proffessional syndicates have also been 
dominated by Islamist groups during the 1990s, despite intensive government attempts to 
interfere. In 1992, groups calling themselves the “Islamic Trend” and “Islamic Voice” 
won control over the Lawyer’s Syndicate and the Doctor’s Syndicate. In the case of the 
later, Islamists won seventy-two percent of the vote despite the fact that the Doctor’s
■ jo  I
Syndicate has a heavy Coptic Christian presence. Other syndicates controlled by the 
Islamists include the Pharmacists, Scientists and Engineer’s Guild.
Although most of these Islamist groups were peaceful and have extended 
recognition of Coptic Christian presence in Egypt, extremist have continued to attack 
Christians in the name of religion. Islamist militant groups have often robbed Coptic 
businessmen in order to finance their operations, while in 1992, reports surfaced of 
Muslims in the town of Manshiet Nasr who were forcing their Christian neighbours to 
pay them jizyah ,333 In 1995, thirteen Copts were murdered during mass at the St. George 
Church in Abu Korkas.334 Two years later, violence claimed the lives of fourteen Copts
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in Bahgoura.335 In 1998, in the village of al-Kosheh, two Christians were beaten to death 
in a brawl. Perhaps more significant, attempts by newspapers like al-Watani and human
in/:
rights groups to investigate the incident were frustrated by the government. In 2000, 
violence flared once more in al-Kosheh, with twenty-two people killed in a riot involving 
shooting from both Christians and Muslims.337 The basis of the violence was a simple 
argument between a Christian trader and a Muslim shopper which eventually lead to riots
- I I O
that lasted for over forty-eight hours.
Sectarian violence would again break out in the city of Alexandria in October 
2005 in response to a play being released on DVD which made several offensive 
statements about Islam. Encouraged by inflammatory articles in the al-Osbo newspaper, 
a Muslim youth stabbed a nun, Sarah Rushdie Sidhum Mikhail, for allegedly selling the 
DVD.339 After Friday prayers, a crowd of over three thousand Muslims began to attack 
Christian churches and businesses, as well as state security personnel.340 After the 
violence had settled, four churches in Alexandria were damaged, as well as numerous 
Christian businesses. Over sixty-three people were injured in the violence, including 
twenty-nine police officers.341 The most recent violence occurred on April 14, 2006, 
when 25 year old Mahmoud Salah-Eddin Abdel-Raziq attacked worshipers in
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Alexandrian churches. The resulting deaths and injuries began sustained protest from 
Christians calling upon an end to Coptic persecution.342
It is important to note that the state no longer engages in the inflammatory 
language that was prevalent during the presidency of Anwar Sadat. On the contrary, a 
sustained rhetoric of national unity has been a key foundation of the Mubarak era. This 
can be seen in symbolic gestures, such as the President’s son Gamal Mubarak attending 
Pope Shenuda’s Christmas mass in 2003, the same year the celebration became 
recognized as a national holiday.343 Extremist attacks are responded to very seriously by 
state security forces, but little is done to comprehensively remove the root source of 
sectarian tensions. According to S. S. Hasan, the state is very careful not to eliminate 
Islamist groups, opting instead to contain and control them.344 This would represent a 
relationship that would not be unlike that which exists between the state and the Coptic 
Orthodox Church. In both cases, a balance has been created by which a level of 
vulnerability is maintained to promote a system which favours Mubarak’s supremacy.345
342 “Coptic Church Attack Sparks Anger,” BBC News Online 15 April 2006; accessed 16 April 2006; 
available from http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/middle_east/4911346.stm.
343 “Egypt marks Copts' Christmas,” BBC News Online 7 January 2003; accessed 7 July 2006; available 
from http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/middle_east/2635341.stm.
344 Hasan, 264.
345 Negad al-Borai, interview.
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C h a p t e r  F i v e : T h e  F o u n d a t i o n s  o f  C l e r i c a l  A u t h o r i t y  a n d  M e c h a n i s m s  o f
C h r i s t i a n  C o m m u n a l  S o l i d a r i t y
The previous chapters have focused mainly on the political environment in which 
the Coptic Orthodox Church finds itself. In order to outline the patron-client relationship 
between the clergy and the regime however, discussion must shift to describe the 
dynamics of the Orthodox Christian community itself. Chapter Two described patron- 
client relationships generally as an exchange between two actors. In order for such a 
relationship to exist, the Coptic community would need a significant level of communal 
solidarity under a single authority. This is not always the case with sectarian groups, as 
communities often can have competing authorities each trying to lead at a national 
level.346 High levels of factionalism, not surprisingly, often destabilize any attempt at a 
systemic patron-client arrangement. The question therefore is whether Egyptian 
Christians represent a unified community, and if so, is this community unified under the 
Orthodox Church as previously suggested.
The premise of this chapter is therefore to demonstrate the mechanisms with 
which the Orthodox Church uses to maintain communal solidarity under its authority. 
The Church’s position as communal patron has not gone unchallenged, as secular groups 
and other Christian denominations exist within Egypt, disrupting Coptic clerical control. 
The foundation of clerical power, not surprisingly, depends partly on ideologies which 
place religious concerns over secular-political ones. Put another way, the power of the 
Orthodox Church depends on a Coptic identity which is religiously active and politically 
apathetical. The specific need for this political apathy will be fully explained when the
346 Schmidt, et al., 135.
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patron-client relationship with the regime is outlined in Chapter Six. This chapter 
however, will simply attempt to demonstrate that the Orthodox Church pressures its 
community to avoid participation in mainstream political life.
In order to achieve this apathy, the Orthodox Church relies on theological 
traditions which it uses as an ideological base to urge Coptic Christians not to engage in 
secular political life. These ideologies all promote a denial of material concerns for 
concentration on spiritual sacrifice and religious activities.
Concepts of political apathy are also based on historical mentalities of 
exceptionalism and victimization within the Coptic community, identities which have 
been emphasized in order to justify ideologies of political apathy. The combination of 
these historical mentalities and the theological beliefs described above therefore create a 
powerful motivation for religious activities outside of the mainstream political sphere. 
Therefore, an in-depth examination of both will monopolize the first section of this 
chapter. The second section will focus on how these ideologies, and, more importantly, 
the Orthodox Church itself was able to regain control of the Coptic community during the 
20th Century.
Roman and Byzantine Persecution o f Coptic Christians
The roots of the above mentioned mentalities are in many ways linked to the 
feeling of vulnerability discussed in Chapter Four. These perceptions pre-date Islam 
however, and can be traced to the rise of Christianity in Egypt itself. Legend describes 
how the apostle St. Mark journeyed into Africa to establish the Holy See of Alexandria 
on May 8th, 68 AD.347 He would establish an unbroken line of 117 patriarchs which
347 Meinardus, 28.
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would lead up to the current Coptic pontiff.348 In reality the history of Christianity’s 
influx into Egypt is slightly more complex. Historical information on the apostles of 
Jesus by and large does not exist, meaning there is no actual evidence to support the 
narrative that St. Mark brought Christianity to the region.349 In fact, almost no concrete 
information on the Christian community of Egypt exists before the 2nd Century AD.350 
Historians believe however, that the movement began within the Hellenistic Jewish 
community of Alexandria.351 Roman authorities certainly considered early Christians to 
be a Jewish cult, and evidence exists to demonstrate the community was subject to anti- 
Jewish laws of the period.352 These laws included orders to immediately execute people 
found to not worship pagan gods as well as edicts which made proselytizing a crime for 
Jews. Jewish persecution was nothing new in the Empire, but was growing steadily 
during the first century A.D., with a massacre by Tiberius Julius Alexander in the year 66 
and the widespread violence which accompanied the destruction of the second temple in 
Jerusalem four years later.354 Under the Emperor Trajan, Jewish revolts in 115 A.D. lead 
to a retaliation so severe that it almost eliminated the community in Egypt entirely.355
Christian separation from Judaism likely began in the second century A.D. and 
would take almost three hundred years to complete.356 Ironically, this process was most 
likely aided by the weakening of Jewish orthodox influence teachings under Roman
348 Ibid., 29.
349 Florence D. Friedman, Beyond the Pharaohs: Egypt and the Copts in the 2nd to 7th Centuries A.D (Rhode 
Island: R hode Is land  S choo l o f  D esign , 1989), 41.
350 Birger A. Pearson, Gnosticism and Christianity in Roman and Coptic Egypt (New York: T&T Clark 
International, 2004), 12.
351 Friedman, 41 and Pearson, 15.
352 Watterson, 24.
353 Watterson, 21 and 202.
354 Pearson, 83.
355 Ibid., 83.
356 Ibid., 88.
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persecution.357 This does not mean however, that persecution from pagan Roman 
authorities would cease to target Christians.358 In fact, evidence points to Egypt being a
-IC Q
major centre for pagan imperial violence against Christians. Some of the first waves of
persecution were ordered by the Emperor Decius, but these were soon surpassed by the 
unprecedented attacks carried out under the reign of Diocletian. During this period, 
hundreds of churches were razed, with their congregations enslaved, imprisoned and 
tortured. Tens of thousands were killed for their Christian beliefs during this period , 
which is still remembered as the “era of the martyrs”.
Eventually persecution would end under Constantine, and the Church of 
Alexandria would be allowed to establish itself as a mainstream religious centre. The 
Coptic Church had already organized itself as an autonomous organization under its first 
historically verifiable patriarch, St. Demetrius (circa. 125 AD).363 Under his 
administration, a college of elders (presbyters) was created in order to unify Christians 
within Egypt.364 This presbyteroi would also select the various bishops (episcopus) in 
Egypt, including the Patriarch of Alexandria. As the power of the Egyptian Church 
expanded, it began to produce some of the great minds of early Christianity, including 
Titus Flavius Clement (160-215 A.D.) and his pupil Origen.366 In fact, Alexandria would 
become increasingly important in the development of Christian theology until infighting
357 Cannayuyer, 20.
358 Mordechai Nisan, Minorities in the Middle East: A History o f Struggle and Self-Expression. 2nd ed. 
(L ondon: M cF arland  &  C om pany  Inc., 2002), 135.
359 Cannuyer, 26.
360 Watterson, 31-33.
361 Friedman, 42.
362 Cannauyer, 26.
363 Ibid., 20.
364 Pearson, 16.
365 Cannauyer, 19.
366 Hasan, 24.
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and internal schisms began.367 Within a short time, Egyptian Christianity would again be 
persecuted and forced out the mainstream, only this time, the violence would be carried 
out by other Christians.
In order to understand the next wave of persecutions against Egyptian 
Christianity, it is necessary to briefly discuss various Christological arguments that would 
develop during the reign of Constantine and his successors. As pagan persecution ended 
and various Christian churches were allowed to become mainstream, debate began over 
the plurality of interpretations which existed at the time. Christology, simply the study of 
the nature of Christ, was one of the main points of contention. Questions over what the 
term “Son of God” and “Son of Man” actually meant with regards to Christian belief 
were considered extremely important.
One of the most prominent Christological movements which would later be 
declared heretical by the Roman Empire was Arianism. Founded by the North African 
theologian Arius (256-336 A.D.), the movement described Christ as existentially less 
divine than the Father.369 This meant that Christ and the Father were not of the same 
substance and that a clear hierarchy existed between them. Other theologians, like 
Nestorius (386-451 AD) believed that Christ was two distinct persons, one wholly divine, 
and one wholly human.370 Another opinion was held by Eutyches (380-456 A.D.), a 
monk from Constantinople who argued both of Christ’s natures were divine and that his 
material body was not that of a normal man.371 It is interesting to note that all of these
367 Watterson, 36.
368 Fletcher, 4.
369 Friedman, 42.
370 Watterson, 42.
371 Fouad Guirguis, The Difficult Years o f Survival: A Short History of the Coptic Church (New York: 
Vintage Press, 1985), 9.
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opinions were eventually considered heretical by the Imperial Church. The essential 
reason for this revolves around Orthodox understandings of the significance of Christ’s 
resurrection. If Christ was not human and divine, it was argued, there would be no saving 
grace from his death and resurrection.372 The Orthodox answer to this question would be 
largely decided at the Council of Nicaea (325 A.D.) where a decision was made by 
assembled theologians that Jesus is both God and Man within a single substance
‘X'l'X(homoousis).
The next wave of controversy would revolve around the nature of how Jesus’ two 
essences interacted within the person of Christ, a debate which would result in a return to 
the brutal persecution of the Egyptian Church. The Egyptians (along with other Christian 
sects) believed in a theology of monophysitism, a philosophy which states that Christ’s 
human and divine natures were completely fused into one essence through the mystery of 
the incarnation.374 According to the current Coptic patriarch, Pope Shenuda III, “His 
humanity is one with His Divinity without commixture, without confusion, without 
division, without separation.”375 In other words, Christ was “one person from two 
persons”.376 The Imperial position at the Council of Chalcedon was only slightly 
different, that Christ had two essences which, although permanently united within one 
substance, remained unmixed.377 It is difficult to imagine that such a small theological 
difference could lead to the brutal persecution of the Egyptian Church by Constantinople. 
Not surprisingly, there is also a much more earthly explanation for the rift which was to
372 Friedman, 35.
373 Ibid., 43.
374 Meinardus, 53.
375 Ibid., 6.
376 Wakin, 6.
377 Meinardus, 53.
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come. As mentioned above, the prominence of the See of Alexandria was unquestionable 
during this period, and rivalries had developed between its Patriarch and the Patriarch of 
the Imperial capital of Constantinople. Many historians argue that the Council of 
Chalcedon was simply an attempt to undermine Alexandria’s power.378 During this 
period, the most efficient way to undermine the Egyptian Church was to trap their
T7QPatriarch in heresy.
Persecution of the Egyptian Church began swiftly. Imperial authorities handed 
over control of the See of Alexandria, despite serious riots amongst Egyptian Christians, 
to bishops who accepted the tenets of the Council of Chalcedon.380 These bishops would 
therefore form what would be called the “Melkite” or Imperial Church.381 From this 
moment on, a distinct schism would be formed between Egyptian bishops loyal to 
Constantinople, and the majority of Egyptian clerics and believers who held a staunchly 
monophysite philosophy. To signal their independence, monophysite churches began to 
write in Coptic instead of Greek, in an attempt to demonstrate that they represented the 
true Egyptian Christianity. Byzantine authorities, pushing to ensure adherence to 
orthodoxy, engaged in serious persecutions of the Egyptian monophysites, particularly 
under Emperor Leo (474) and Justinian (6th Century A.D.).383 According to Aziz S. 
Atiya, “unbearable excessive taxation and the most horrible torture and humiliation were 
inflicted upon the Christians throughout the period from 451 to 641 until the advent of
378 Guirguis, 36.
379 Kyriakos Mikhail, Copts and Muslims Under British Control: A Collection o f Facts and a Resume of 
Authoritative Opinions on the Coptic Question (Port Washington: Kennikat Press, 1911; reprint, 1971), 4.
380 Guirguis, 38.
381 Mikhail, 5.
382 Van Doom-Harder and Vogt, 36.
383 Watterson, 47.
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the Arabs on the scene.”384 That said, monophysite Christianity did not disappear, but 
instead became an expression of Egyptian national pride in the face of foreign Christian 
authorities.385
The goal of the above discussion was to demonstrate that since its very creation 
and with little exception, Egyptian Christianity has existed outside of mainstream 
Christianity. This has created a historical mentality of separation, victimization and 
distinctiveness within the Egyptian Christian community which was been used to 
encourage Copts from involving themselves in modern mainstream politics. This insular 
identity is further exacerbated by ascetic ideologies which are a critical foundation of 
Egyptian Christian theology.
Asceticism in Coptic Ideologies
The earliest roots of ascetic philosophies in the Egyptian Church most likely 
derive from Gnostic cults which slowly replaced Judaism as the primary influence of 
Coptic Christians. Integrated into Christianity by influential theologians like 
Valentinus (100-153 A.D.) and Basilides (117-138 A.D.) 387, Gnosticism infused ascetic 
principles into Coptic Church which still continue today.
Gnostic beliefs represented a complex and diverse tradition, but in its most basic 
form, the movement argued that salvation for mankind could only be achieved through a
000
gnosis (knowledge) of oneself. The material body and lower primal emotions were not 
existentially part of the self, as ones real form was only the divine core of the soul.389 In
384 Aziz S. Atiya, The Copts and Christian Civilization (Utah: University o f Utah Press, 1979), 27.
385 Watterson, 47.
386 Cannuyer, 20.
387 Pearson, 13.
388 Guirguis, 202.
389 Pearson, 97.
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fact, Gnosticism argued that a person’s divine and eternal soul was trapped by their 
material body, and salvation came from attempts to set the soul free.390 Gnostic teachings 
were the only way that this escape could be accomplished.391 Most often on a practical 
level, Gnostic practice advocated a denial of the material world and all bodily
392temptations.
Gnostic philosophies overtime became deluded in Egypt by Christian influence 
over the centuries. Ascetic principles however, would live on in Coptic monasticism, 
another philosophy of self-denial and a rejection of the material world. The roots of 
Egyptian monastic movements pre-date Christianity as well, with historical evidence 
suggesting several groups existed before the birth of Christ. Many of these groups 
practiced similar ascetic philosophies as later Christian monks, suggesting a long­
standing tradition in the region. Examples of pre-Christian monastic groups included the 
Katachoi, who lived in the catacombs of the ancient city of Memphis, as well as the 
Gymnosophists, a group which worshiped the Nile and abstained from meat and 
“passionate emotions”. Other groups included the Rapeutae, a group localized around 
pharonic caves outside Alexandria who sought to heal their souls by purging it of
303 « •desire. These ascetic philosophies of finding solace within the desert would be again 
revived by Christians during the various phases of Roman persecution described above394 
and was arguably a social replacement for the glory of martyrdom.395
390 Friedman, 48.
391 Ibid., 48.
392 Cannuyer, 23.
393 Watterson, 54-55.
394 Cannuyer, 33.
395 Friedman, 45.
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The first Christian to practice monasticism is believed to be St. Anthony (d. 356 
A.D.), who, inspired by the example of the apostles, sold all of his possessions to pursue 
the path of Christ.396 He argued an ascetic life style was ordered by Christ in the Gospel 
of Luke (specifically, Chapter 18, Verse 22) and that all monks must give up pleasure to
• T Q 7the body of any sort, including regular patterns of sleeping and substantive meals.
•3QO
These ideas of dahiya (self-denial) were key to the life of an early Christian monk. 
Although St. Anthony gathered a following around the town of Pispir,399 he himself 
would choose to practise his ascetic monasticism in solitude.400 The advent of coenobite 
or communal monasticism would derive later with Pachomius (d. 348 A.D.), who pushed 
for the creation of self sufficient community monasteries.401 Pachomius also promoted 
ascetic principles, even advocating practices of self-mortification out of a principle of 
torturing the body to save the soul 402 Men were not alone in these ascetic pursuits, as 
historical evidence demonstrates that female monks often wandered the deserts of Egypt 
“looking for God”.403
Coptic writings would celebrate this lifestyle of poverty and self-denial. For 
example, a famous homily written by St. Peter (Patriarch of Alexandria from 300-311 
AD) called On Riches warned Christians not to glorify the material world. God, it 
argues, will avenge the poor against the rich 404 The monastery also preformed an 
important role for lay Copts as well, often serving as shelters during persecution and
396 W atterson , 56.
397 Cannuyer, 33.
398 Van Doom-Harder and Vogt, 61.
399 Waterrson, 59.
400 Atiya, 11.
401 Cragg, 176.
402 Atiya, 12-13.
403 Friedman, 45.
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offering a sense of permanence for the community in the face of uncertainty.405 Monastic 
leaders would join famous martyrs of the faith and other “legendary folk heroes” as a 
symbol of Coptic identity and the foundation for a broader communal framework.406
The significance of the monastery today is no less apparent. Although the revival 
of the Coptic Church will be discussed in the second section of this chapter, it is 
important to understand the role of monasticism in the modern Egyptian community. As 
mentioned above, Copts take extreme pride in the history of their monasteries, which 
were the first to appear in Christendom.407 Today, the monastery is considered an 
“eternal source of religion” and place where God “touches humanity”.408 The monks 
themselves are seen as the very elite of the Coptic Church,409 and their numbers have 
grown substantially during the Twentieth Century. Estimates show that from 1970 to 
1997, the number of monks in the Coptic Church has increased from two hundred to over 
eleven hundred, and the number of nuns from under two hundred to almost eight 
hundred.410 Monks are highly educated and monasteries are increasingly attracting many 
within the Coptic professional elite.411 Monasteries also serve an important practical role, 
increasingly serving as popular sites for baptisms and weddings amongst the Coptic 
youth.412
The most explicit ideological rejection of the material world is, of course, an 
adoration of martyrdom, a belief widely celebrated in Coptic theology. According to 
Christian Cannuyer, “to this day, Coptic spirituality and identity are imbued with the
405 Chitham, 65.
406 Hasan, 4.
407 Hasan, 4.
408 Van Doom-Harder and Vogt, 52.
409 Wakin, 7.
410 “The Church o f the Martyrs,” Christianity Today Vol. 41 (August 1997): 44.
411 Van Doom-Harder and Vogt, 245.
412 Hasan, 218.
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memory of the men and women who died for their faith in the ancient world. Copts may 
even, at times, embrace a kind of obsession with martyrdom, exacerbating their 
conflicts.. .”413 Coptic veneration of martyrs can be traced back to the earliest days of the 
Church, during the periods of intense persecution described above.414 Egyptian Christian 
leaders argued that their communities should not fight or even flee their enemies, as this 
was not the example that Christ demonstrated.415 Barbara Watterson describes that 
“many Christians deliberately sought martyrdom and rejoiced as they went to their deaths 
so that in modern eyes, it may seem that they were neurotic, if not masochistic.. .”416
Even with this intense zeal, the Christian community was seriously strained by the 
unprecedented persecution placed upon them during the reign of Diocletian. With more 
than 144,000 Christians estimated killed,417 this period has been forever enshrined in the 
Coptic Christian mindset. In order to illustrate this, one has to look no further than the 
Coptic calendar, which begins in 284 A.D., the year Diocletian became Emperor and has 
the entire month of September dedicated to the Egyptian Christian martyrs of this 
period.418 Even the calendar itself leaves no ambiguity, being named “the era of the 
martyrs”.419
The significance of the martyr in the Coptic community serves several purposes. 
According to one study, “martyrdom is an identity shaping tool used by communities 
seeking to distinguish itself from the other”.420 Martyrdom also creates heroes which the
413 C annuyer, 26.
414 Van Doom-Harder and Vogt, 121.
415 Hasan, 94.
416 Watterson, 22.
417 Betts, 55.
418 Hasan 22, 25.
419 Van Doom-Harder and Vogt, 124.
420 Jason R. Zaborowski, The Coptic Martyrdom o f John o f Phaniioit: Assimilation and Conversion to 
Islam in Thirteenth Century Egypt (Boston: Koninklijke Brill, 2005), 6.
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Church can use to strengthen the community.421 Some of the most famous Coptic martyrs 
are Apollonia (d. 249 A.D.), St. Michael the Sabaite (9th Century A.D.) and even St. 
Mark, the legendary founder of the Egyptian Church itself.422 In recent times, studies 
have demonstrated that the Coptic Church has been heavily glorifying the idea of 
martyrdom.423 In fact, during a sociological study by Nora Steen, a Coptic Sunday 
school teacher asked a class of four year olds if they were afraid to die as martyrs. The 
answer was a resounding and collective “NO!”424 Even Coptic websites proudly display 
pictures of Egyptian Christians “martyrs” who were killed by Islamist violence in recent 
years.425 According to Sameh Fawzy, a Coptic journalist with al-Watani, the re- 
emergence of martyr rhetoric was designed to shore up the community psychologically 
during Islamist militant violence under Sadat.426 While this may have had some positive 
impact, George Ishak, director of the popular opposition group Kifaya argues that instead 
of focusing on making the world better, many Copts simply “dream of heaven.”427
Evidence also points to a sense of Coptic exceptionalism over the centuries, 
despite the fact that modem scholars argue that there are almost no ethnic, linguistic or
A'JQ
cultural differences between Coptic Christians and Muslims. In fact, research has 
shown that over ninety-percent of Egyptian Muslims have Coptic origins.429 Both 
communities even share customs often thought to be purely Islamic, such as female
Nisan, 150.
422 Watterson, 28, Zaborowski, 20, and Pearson, 102.
423 Van Doom-Harder and Vogt, 124.
424 Shatzm iller, 41.
425 “The Funeral Prayers and Biographies of the 21 Martyrs o f al-Kosheh,” U.S. Copts Association 
(accessed 15 July 2006); available from http://www.copts.net/photos.asp.
426 Informal interview with Sameh Fawzy, Coptic Journalist for al-Watani. (Cairo, Egypt, 17 October 
2005).
427 Informal interview with George Ishak, Head o f the Kifaya Movement. (Cairo, Egypt, 14 December 
2005).
428 Chitham, 17 and Shatzmiller, 35.
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veiling.430 In his famous quote, Lord Cromer describes a Copt as an Egyptian who prays 
in a church, while a Muslim was an Egyptian who prays in a mosque431 Despite the 
overwhelming evidence however, there still is a sense amongst Christians that they are 
the purest descendants of the ancient Egyptians. This belief is not a recent 
development, but is in fact, centuries old. One of the earliest and most vivid examples of 
this mentality can be found in the 13th Century Coptic manuscript The Martyrdom o f 
John o f Phaijoit. The story of an Egyptian Christian who converts to Islam only to be 
martyred for wishing to return to Christianity, the manuscript sheds incredible insight 
into ideals of Christian exceptionalism. Arguing that Muslims in Egypt were Arabs and 
not pharonic Egyptians, the story discusses intermarriage as polluting to the Coptic 
community.433 Christians therefore were warned to avoid Islam’s “sexual traps”.434 
John’s martyrdom at the end of the tale is described as spiritual purification for the sin of 
conversion.435 This belief continued well into the early 20th Century, as Kyriakos 
Mikhail writings on the Copts in Egypt demonstrate. He describes Muslims as Arabs and 
states that Christians are the only true Egyptians.436 Coptic Christians have kept their 
blood pure of “semi-barbarous Arabs and savage Kurds”.437 Christians who converted to 
Islam intermixed and were no longer purely Egyptian 438 Muslims would forever be 
“occupiers”.439 Even today, hardline Copts still speak of themselves as the true
430 Chitham, 20 and Hasan 18-19.
431 H ssan, 18.
432 Van Doom-Harder and Vogt, 126.
433 Zaborowski, 6.
434 Ibid., 20.
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Egyptians.440 In 2005, a DVD was released which consisted of a play preformed in a 
Coptic Church two years earlier. The play I  Once Was Blind but Now I  See, tells the 
story of a man who is convinced to become a Muslim in return for money and a wife, 
only to face death when he returns to Christianity.441 Not surprisingly, the play almost 
identically mirrors the plot of 13th Century story of John of Phaijoit.
Even the use of the term “Copt” has become highly politicized, as Muslims often 
believe that the word, when applied solely to Christians, implies that they are more 
Egyptian than any other group.442 While more moderate Copts and Muslims argue that all 
people within the country are equally Egyptian,443 notions of exceptionalism do still 
exist. Given that the state is dominated by Muslims, these philosophies argue energy 
would be better spent on more important Christian pursuits outside Egypt’s political 
mainstream.
The beliefs outlined above form the foundation of Coptic communal solidarity. 
This identity stresses a historical mindset of sacrifice and exceptionalism, while 
encouraging believers that material power is not as important as spiritual growth. In the 
modem context, this translates into a community which is more pre-occupied with 
religious endeavours than political ones. Discussion will now move however, from this 
examination of ideologies to a focus on how the Coptic Orthodox Church was able to 
assume a hegemonic role over the community.
440 Sameh Fawzy, interview.
441 Robin Moger and John Ehab, “All Over a Play,” Cairo Magazine. Issue 29, Oct 27- Nov 2 2005.
442 Informal Interview with Ehab Salem, human rights activist. (Cairo, Egypt, 8 September 2005).
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Church Controls Over the Coptic Community
During the 19th Century, the Orthodox Coptic Church was the target of increasing 
criticism from various Christian groups in Egypt. One of the most outspoken critics were 
evangelist Christians newly arrived from Europe who claimed the Orthodox clergy was 
hopelessly corrupt.444 Secular Coptic Christians were also greatly concerned about the 
lack of transparency within the Church, and pushed to have greater control over the 
community’s wealth. To that end, despite strong protest from the clergy, a council of 
layman were formed in 1874 and was named the Maglis al-Milli. The council’s role was 
controversial but its secular members were committed to having a say over Coptic 
national affairs.445 Until this time, these matters were handled by the Holy Synod of the 
Coptic Church, the highest ecclesiastical body within the clergy.446 While the Church 
had been attempting to increase its powers over all Christian judicial matters,447 the 
Maglis sought to limit their influence to religious considerations only.448 One of the key 
controversies between the Maglis and the Synod was over which would control monastic 
endowments or waqf.449 According to secular Copts, the clergy was mismanaging the 
funds to the detriment of the community. One example they used to highlight this was 
the monastery at Deir al-Muharraq, which was in need of serious renovations despite the 
fact that it produced a massive eighty-seven percent annual net-profit.450 The Maglis 
called for a special council to be formed to handle all Coptic endowments. This council 
would be elected by the Maglis and approved by the Patriarch. The Patriarch and the
444 Carter, 26.
445 Nisan 139.
446 Meinardus, 9.
447 Muhammad Afifi, “The State and the Church in Nineteenth Century Egypt,” Die Welt des Tslams Vol.
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448 Hasan, 58.
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synod did not back down from the challenge however, and spared no effort in resisting 
any encroachment of its powers 451 Other later disputes arose during the following 
decades when the Maglis attempted to influence who was elected as patriarch of the 
Church452
For the most part however, Copts outside of the upper class gave their loyalty to 
the clergy.453 This is supported by British reports during the early twentieth century 
which argued that Copts outside of Cairo largely did not have the same political 
ideologies as the elite. The British went further to say that attempts by secular Copts to 
mobilize (specifically during the 1911 conference in Asyut), represented the will of 
upper-class Copts only (about 12,000 out of 700,000 Christians in Egypt) 454 Although 
these conclusions were criticized by Coptic intellectuals who believed British findings to 
be superficial,455 the role of the Church would increase drastically after the country’s elite 
were weakened under the presidency of Gamal Abdul Nasser.
Moreover, the upper class of the Coptic community spumed most of the 
ideologies discussed during this chapter as superstition 456 According to S.S. Hasan, the 
Coptic elite had “no notion of indigenous culture, it is a neo-colonial identity with 
international flavours”.457 It was this cultural dichotomy which encouraged much of the 
tension between Coptic elite and the clergy during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. 
The political challenge to the Coptic Church by Christian upper class would be ended 
however, during the policies of the 1952 Revolution. The victory of the Free Officer’s
451 Ibid., 29, 34-36.
452 Ibid., 29.
453 Ibid., 41.
454 Mikhail, 21,36.
455 Ibid., 21.
456 Hasan, 5.
457 Hasan, 5.
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Movement over the monarchy led to aggressive economic reforms that would have a 
devastating effect on all of Egypt’s wealthy elite. In 1952, laws were promulgated 
limiting land ownership to a maximum of two - three hundred feddans (in 1961, this was 
again reduced to a maximum of one hundred feddans).458 The remaining lands, as well as 
over 15,000 foreign businesses, were nationalized, including British and French 
companies which controlled the Suez Canal.459 Landowners were broken as Nasser 
moved Egypt to a strict command economy.460 The economic policies of the Revolution 
would severely strike at the Coptic elite, as the community lost seventy-five percent of its 
wealth, forcing the closure of schools and other social institutions 461 Even the Church 
was targeted, with real-estate and waqfs (endowments) being nationalized 462 In response, 
thousands of Copts emigrated to Europe and North America in order to protect their 
wealth.463
The damage to the Coptic elite was not only economic, but political as well.
• fViDespite their involvement with politics during the first half of the 20 Century, Christians 
played almost no part in the Free Officers Movement which overthrew the monarchy and 
would not share in power afterwards.464 Christian representation in parliament dropped 
to less than one percent,465 as the community was systematically removed from the 
diplomatic service, education and economic ministries.466 The collapse of the upper class
458 V atik io tis, 392.
459 Ibid., 389, 392.
460 Ibid., 392.
461 Shatzmiller, 26.
462 Cannuyer, 103.
463 Solihin, 13.
464 Nisan, 144.
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left the Coptic middle class as the dominate members of the community. Unlike the elite, 
these Christians were much more religious, and much closer to the clergy.467
Nasser’s reforms did not purposefully target the Coptic elite more than their 
Muslim counterparts. In order to set up authoritarian control however, all competitors 
outside of the Free Officer’s Movement needed to be suppressed. That said, many of 
Nasser’s policies actually helped the Coptic Church, especially the massive effort to 
undermine Islamists groups like the Muslim Brotherhood 468 Nasser even allowed the 
Church to build a massive cathedral in Cairo during the 1960s, in order to maintain 
Coptic goodwill.469 Nasser did try to undermine some Coptic groups, outlawing one 
radical movement, the al-Ummah al-Qibtiyyah, an organization with almost 100,000 
members.470 He also passed a law dissolving the Maglis al-Milli in 1962.471 Nasser’s 
rhetoric would make it clear that his policies were not designed to persecute Copts, but to 
create a structure of authoritarianism. Negative remarks would target only what he saw 
to be Coptic fanatics who were “obsessed” with being a minority.472
The hegemony of the Orthodox Church, as briefly mentioned above, was also 
challenged by foreign Christian denominations. When foreign Christian missionaries 
entered the country during the 19th Century, they expected the Orthodox Church to be 
their natural ally 473 Contrary to their expectations, the Coptic Church vehemently 
resisted Western missionaries, especially those from the Catholic Church.474 These 
efforts have largely been successful, as statistics demonstrate ninety to ninety-five
467 Hasan, 58.
468 Ibid., 104.
469 Ibid., 104.
470 Solihin, 17.
471 Meinardus, 74.
472 Wakin, 69.
473 Solihin, 47.
474 Ibid, 31, 33.
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percent of Egyptian Christians remain in the Orthodox Church.475 Even Copts that have 
converted to other Christian sects maintain a link with the Orthodox clergy, attending 
festivals and even choosing to get married within their traditional Church.476
Now that evidence has been presented to demonstrate the potential of Church 
hegemony over the Coptic Christian community, the remainder of this chapter will focus
tVion how hegemony was obtained. During the late 19 Century, the Orthodox Church 
itself was undergoing calls from within to reform. Amongst the clergy, pressure rose to 
remove the stagnate “old guard”.477 Efforts began slowly, as Pope Kyrillos IV (1854-
4.7R1866) began to push for changes to the liturgy and communal infrastructure. Many 
reforms would also be inspired by lay members of the community, such as Habib Girgis, 
who started the enormously successful Sunday School Movement in 19 1 8.479 This 
program, largely designed to counter protestant evangelism in the Coptic community 
worked to increase the importance of traditional Christian rituals with the Egyptian 
youth.480 As the program grew in strength, it helped train Coptic Christians respond to 
religious polemics from various sources which criticized Orthodox Christian beliefs.481 
The program’s success was so great that by 1940, over 42,000 students were enrolled in 
religious classes.482
Renewal of Christian religious fervour can also be seen largely as a response to 
growing Islamist movements amongst Muslims.483 Whereas the first such signs of
475 H asan, 20  and  Shatzm iller, 90.
476 Wakin, 26.
477 Hasan, 6.
478 Cannuyer, 94.
479 Ibid., 102.
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revival were seen within the secular community, momentum would quickly shift towards 
a clergy-dominated movement. During the mid-twentieth century, the Church had begun 
to consolidate its authority in the community.484 Factions within the clergy began to push 
for the Orthodox Church to reorganize itself to meet modem challenges. Before reforms 
took root corruption was rampant, with many Coptic priests so poorly funded that they 
either sold “healing miracles” or concentrated on serving the rich members of the 
community at the expense of their congregation.485 Under Pope Kyrillos VI (1959-1971), 
modernization efforts would end this and would accelerate restoration on various 
monasteries throughout Egypt.486
In order to be effective at resistance from other factions in the clergy, reformers
• 487  • • •cloaked their rhetoric within calls to return to the fundamentals of faith. Activities and 
projects inspired by the reform movement made strong use of traditional images and
4.88ideologies to deflect criticism and successfully shield the movement from resistance. 
According to S.S. Hasan, these reforms, though radical, were much more a case of 
revival than revolution.489
The current Pope of the Orthodox Church, Shenuda III, is also largely responsible 
for the clergy’s return to power.490 A strong believer in Church-based social programs, 
the patriarch argued strongly during the 1970s for the Christian community to re-vamp 
and reorganize themselves.491 Since then, the Church has helped fund schools, hospitals
Shatzmiller, 60.
485 Hasan, 74.
486 Cannuyer, 102.
487 Hasan, 6.
488 Ibid., 6.
489 Ibid., 4.
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and services to communities which the state could not afford to help.492 Beyond just 
basic amenities however, several programs have been designed specifically to help assert 
Coptic loyalty towards the clergy. One program, the Nota Ruhiyah (spiritual notebook) 
movement would travel to villages throughout Egypt offering medical aid to Christians. 
While there, observers would catalogue for the Church the spiritual conditions of its 
residents.493 Another program, Bayl al-Khilwah (house of retreat) was created to allow 
teens to experience the monastic lifestyle of the clergy. This experience leaves many 
teens with a higher respect and connection with the monasteries and even convinces some 
to later join the monastery as adults 494 Student groups like Usar Jamiiyah Qibtiyyah have 
also been organized mainly to help Christians defend against campus Islamists groups.495 
The clergy even has an official position, the Bishop of Youth, whose task it is to integrate 
youth within the “clerical space”.496
By and large, these programs have been extremely successful, as the Coptic 
Christian community have increasingly turned to the Church since the 1952 Revolution. 
Turning inwards towards Christian social groups have given Copts a sphere where they 
can exercise control and are no longer the minority.497 Although critics often argue that 
the Pope’s policies are placing a cocoon around his community,498 increasing numbers of 
educated Coptic professions are turning to the clergy as a career,499 and even secular 
social activities within the community are now largely preceded by prayers.500 Even
492 Carter, 48.
493 Hasan, 79.
494 Ibid., 81.
495 Ibid., 182.
496 Ibid., 184.
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498 Ibid., 197.
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500 Hasan, 213.
103
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
when President Sadat tried to re-vive the Maglis al-Milli to weaken the Church, the 
Council’s secular members would no longer challenge the clergy and generally followed 
the instructions of the Patriarch.501
Reforms have also centralized the clergy under the papacy’s authority. 
Traditionally, Coptic Bishops have always shown deep respect for the patriarch, often 
prostrating to him to demonstrate devotion.502 Ceremony aside however, Shenuda has 
worked hard to end the semi-feudal arrangement of Egypt’s dioceses, dividing districts in 
strategically in order to help him select his supporters as bishops.503 The Patriarch has 
also successfully reconnected parishes in the diaspora with his central authority and has 
reintegrated them within the hierarchy of Coptic Church.504 Challenges within the clergy 
still occur, such as a 2002 movement which saw a group of Christians claim that the Holy 
Spirit declared they were to be the leaders of the Orthodox Church.505 Another challenge 
came from Bishop Maximus I, who declared he would now lead a new Church in Egypt 
in 2006.506 Largely these challenges are not effective against the power of the papacy, as 
Pope Shenuda has demonstrated a willingness to excommunicate those that challenge his 
authority.
The impact of the Church’s control and the dominance of traditional mentalities 
outlined earlier in this chapter led to a Coptic identity which pledges allegiance first to 
religion and only than to the Egyptian state.507 A half-century of communal organization
501 Ibid., 139.
502 Ibid., 6.
503 Ibid., 124-127.
504 Ibid., 129.
505 “Egyptian Church Dismisses 13 Clerics,” BBC News Online 5 July 2002, accessed on 28 July 2006; 
available from http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/middle_east/2100001 .stm.
506 “Egyptians Sue New Church Leader,” BBC News Online 4 July 2006, accessed on 28 July 2006; 
available from http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/middle_east/5145988.stm.
507 Shatzmiller, 34.
104
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
has left the Church in control of social services in return for the right to be a 
spokesperson for all Egyptian Christians.508 Shenuda consistently encourages Copts to 
focus on the creation of a separate Christian sphere under Church control.509 
Commitment to the new Church means a withdrawal from mainstream Egyptian political 
activities.510 This has been extremely detrimental to Coptic political participation in 
Egypt, and has given the Pope the capability to negotiate a clientelist relationship with 
President Mubarak.
508 Ibid., 77.
509 Hasan, 99.
510 Shatzmiller, 76.
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C h a p t e r  S i x : T h e  C l i e n t e l i s t  R e l a t i o n s h i p  B e t w e e n  C h u r c h  a n d  S t a t e  
The previous chapters have discussed questions of theory, explored elements of 
the Egyptian political landscape and the dynamics of Coptic religious sphere. During the 
last chapter, it was demonstrated that the Coptic Orthodox Church has set itself up as the 
hegemonic contact point between the Christian community and the Egyptian state. In this 
chapter, the nature of this relationship will be explored and described.
In Chapter Two, the ideal modern clientelist system was described as a 
progression where regional brokers had a declining share of power within the system. 
As the state’s bureaucratic power solidified, patron politicians could increasingly connect 
with their clients directly. Chapter Five has demonstrated that within the context of the 
Christian-State relationship, this is not the case. The institution of the Coptic Orthodox 
Church stands in between regime and the possibility of forming a Christian client base. 
Does the Church therefore represent a broker as demonstrated in figure 6.1?
B roker (O rth o d o x  C hurch)
T h e S ta te
C lien t Population  
(C o p tic  C hristians)
political support
political support econom ic resources
Figure 6.1: Model of the Church as a Clientelist Broker
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There are several problems with the above model. First, the last chapter has 
demonstrated that the Church itself provides social programs for Coptic Christians 
without the help of the state. Rather than a simple transmission of the patron state’s 
resources directly to the client, these programs appear to originate within the Orthodox 
Church itself. Moreover, the Church was able to provide these resources under state 
pressure during President Sadat. The state seemingly has no direct control over these 
resources and does not control the loyalty of the client. In the words of S.S. Hasan, the 
Christian religious space had become entirely a political counter-space within Egypt.511 
The following paragraphs will therefore explore the possibility of a more complex model 
while examining the interactions between the Coptic Christian religious sphere and the 
state.
The lack of state control over the Church’s sphere of influence is strongly 
demonstrated during the presidency of Anwar Sadat, who routinely attacked Pope 
Shenuda on the grounds of trying to form a state within a state.512 Sadat’s arguments 
were most likely sincere, as he believed the Christian community was setting up an 
institutional autonomy that threatened national unity.513 Shenuda’s activities were highly 
politicized, with his bible study meetings more often then not resembling large Christian 
rallies. In reality, the autonomy of the Christian sphere was not calling for the violent 
creation of separate state. It did however, threaten the systemic authoritarian patron- 
client described in Chapter Three, as Shenuda pressured the Coptic Christian community 
to not cooperate with the state under Sadat.514 Not surprisingly, the threat of one group
511 Hasan, 262.
512 Solihin, 82.
513 Van-Doom Harder and Vogt, 249.
514 Nisan, 150.
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breaking away from the regime’s system of control would contribute greatly to the 
destabilization of authoritarianism within the state, making it essential for Sadat to keep it 
from succeeding. So significant was the growing power of the Church that it led directly 
to Shenuda’s arrest under Presidential decree 439 of 1981.515 According to John Watson, 
Shenuda had “dabbled his hands in politics and burnt his fingers”.516 There is a truth to 
this statement, as Sadat’s actions strongly demonstrated that the Church was still 
vulnerable to the regime’s power. Indicted in the Court of Values, Shenuda faced 
charges of endangering national unity and peace, provoking hatred of the government, 
giving the Church “political overtones” and inciting conflict by ordering bishops to 
coerce and manipulate the government.517 Only the controversy over carrying out a case 
against the Pope’s sacred position prevented Shenuda from being tried.518 This still did 
not protect the Coptic Patriarch completely however, as Sadat used his position to appoint 
five of Shenuda’s opponents to run the Church while the patriarch was under house 
arrest. During their tenure, the Church would no longer engage in the politicized 
activities that were characteristic of Shenuda’s rule.519
The transition to the Mubarak presidency however, would symbolize a dramatic 
shift for the Coptic Patriarch. The first indications of this shift occurred during a trip by 
President Mubarak to the White House which was to be disrupted by Coptic Christians 
within the diaspora who demanded the release of Shenuda. Personally appealing to his 
followers while under house arrest, Shenuda commanded Copts to “welcome the new
Van-Doom Harder and Vogt, 249.
516 Watson, 115.
517 Saad Eddin Ibrahim, The Copts o f Egypt (London: Minority Rights Group, 1996.), 20.
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President in love and submission...”520 Later in 1983, Shenuda would write several 
letters to Mubarak declaring confidence in his work for national unity.521 Eventually it 
was decided by the ruling party to release Shenuda in 1985, provided the patriarch abided 
by several key limits. These included Shenuda avoided making political statements, 
regularly returned to the desert to spend time in the monastery, avoided Cairo on Fridays 
and limited appearances in Alexandria. The three latter conditions were in response to
522threats against the Patriarch’s life but still represented key restrictions on his activities. 
During his first service after being released from confinement, Shenuda described the 
liturgy as “a wonderful meeting of Love, arranged for you by our President, Hosni 
Mubarak.”523
During the Mubarak era, Shenuda has been “at peace” with the ruling party, at all 
times being extremely cordial with the President and constantly preaching tolerance for 
Muslims.524 The nature of this transition is quite startling, considering Shenuda’s 
controversial personality. Even before becoming Pope, Shenuda had to be restrained as a 
bishop from confrontational activities which had disturbed the patience of President
r 9  c
Nasser. During the Mubarak period however, Shenuda consistently espoused a “turn 
the cheek” martyr philosophy to his followers.526 Shenuda’s public activities were no 
longer political, but have focused entirely on ecclesiastical matters. Despite the 
temptation to say that the Pope’s reversal is completely due to a feeling of vulnerability 
to the state, the actual foundation of policy shift is rooted in an understanding that
520 Ibrahim, The Copts o f  Egypt. 20.
521 Watson, 112.
522 Watson, 116.
523 Ibid., 116.
524 Shatzmiller 62.
525 Hasan, 85.
526 Ibid., 119.
527 Watson, 117.
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President Mubarak would spend a significant amount of time undermining Islamists
c - y o  t t ,
extremist groups which had constantly harassed Christians. While its true violence 
against Christians has not ceased completely, as evident in Chapter Four, this simple 
agreement would form the base of the clientelist arrangement between Church and State. 
Mubarak, unlike Sadat, has also made no attempt to criticize Coptic autonomy, and has 
allowed the Church to independently control the Coptic Christian community. Moreover, 
Mubarak maintains contact only with the clergy, and does not meet with secular Christian 
political activists.529
Despite this, according to Gasser Abdel Razek from the Egyptian Organization 
for Human Rights, there have been only superficial improvements in Christian rights 
under President Mubarak.530 Many of these improvements have been religious 
concessions, such as the declaration that Coptic Christmas was to be a national 
holiday.531 Other concessions include forcing Christians who want to convert to Islam to 
sit with Coptic priests in private to confirm that there is no outside pressure and to give 
the Church an opportunity to convince the person to not become an apostate.532 There 
have also been concessions with regards to the official school curriculum, which now 
gives some attention to Coptic history.533
Perhaps the most effective concessions by the regime to the Coptic clergy come in 
the form of church permits. The current laws regarding the construction or repair of 
churches can be traced back to the 1856 Hamayouni Decree which abolished the dhimmi
528 Hasan, 115.
529 George Ishak, Interview.
530 Gasser Abdel Razek, interview.
531 Gasser Abdel Razek, interview and Neumann.
532 Ehab Salem, Interview.
533 Neumann and al-Borai interview.
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system in Egypt.534 This act demands that permits for churches must come directly from 
the executive authority.535 In 1934 this law was strengthened by the Interior Ministry, 
which added several conditions for building churches. These conditions insisted that 
permits required a report included which answered the following questions: Was the land 
empty or agricultural? Was the person who owned the land presenting the request? What 
was the distance to the nearest mosque? Is it near a Christian or Muslim settlement? Do 
nearby Muslims object? Does the head of the denomination approve of this request? Is 
there a church of the same denomination already in the town and what is the Christian 
population of the area? Finally, was the proposed church near government resources and 
if so, does it have the proper approval from the relevant ministry?536 Even after the 
relevant answers were collected, permits were difficult to obtain. In fact, during the 
period between 1981 and 1990, only ten permits for church construction and twenty-six 
for church repairs were issued.537 Permits are not necessarily rejected, but are often 
delayed for years, even several decades. Repairs need not be significant to be delayed, 
as some pending requests included permission to attach an awning to a church in Asyut, 
and even permission for another to knock down a wall within their own building. 
Efforts are made more complicated by intolerant segments of Muslim communities who 
attempt to complicate the process as much as possible. Unlike churches, mosques can be 
built without any special permit.540 In some instances, mosques were hastily constructed
534 Shatzmiller, 25.
535 Negad al-Borai. The Guillotine and the Pit: Freedom o f Expression n Egypt 2002-2003 (Cairo: Embassy 
of Switzerland, 2004), 22.
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next to land being approved for a church in order to raise complaints.541 Obviously, 
given the frustrating environment, many Christians have proceeded with church 
construction without proper permits.542 This tactic can be extremely dangerous however, 
as several churches built without permission have been struck by arsonists.543
The controversial nature of church construction therefore makes the approval of 
proper permits a very significant gesture which the ruling party has used to maintain a 
clientelist relationship with the clergy. Despite statements that the clergy is politically 
neutral, secular Coptic experts like George Ishak and Sameh Fawzy are convinced that 
they are steadfast in their support for the National Democratic Party.544 According to 
Sameh Fawzy, there is a direct correlation to instances where the clergy has provided the 
ruling party with their support, and in return received the approval of church permits. 
This was particularly the case with the 2005 presidential elections, where the Church 
officially endorsed President Mubarak in return for the approval of permits.545 Soon 
afterwards, the President made further concessions announcing a policy shift regarding 
church permits which allowed repairs to be made while awaiting approval. This is quite a 
significant gain, particularly when in addition to other recent decrees which stipulate that 
repairs now only needed approval from the regional governor, rather than from the 
President himself.546
Despite the implication that the Church plays a hegemonic role in the lives of all 
Coptic Christians, political activists do exist. Many work with secular human rights
541 Hssan, 210.
542 Watson, 67.
543 Van-Doom Harder and Vogt, 249.
544 George Ishak interview and Sameh Fawzy interview.
545 Sameh Fawzy interview.
546 “Church Building Regulations Eased,” Human Rights Without Frontiers 19 December 2005 [online 
report]; accessed on 31 July 2006; available from http://www.hrwf.net/html/2005PDF/Egypt_2005.pdf.
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groups within the country, because Christian NGOs focus almost entirely on development 
issues.547 According to Ahmed Samih, Director of the Al-Andalus Center for Tolerance 
and Anti-Violence Studies, Egyptian human rights NGOs have to struggle to pull the 
youth away from Church programs in order to get them involved.548 George Ishak, 
Director of the opposition movement Kifaya agrees, but states that this is difficult 
considering the state surrounds the youth at such an early age.549 Pressure on Copts to 
join Church organizations is extremely pronounced, and people who refuse to get 
involved in Church programs are often ostracized and labelled in front of the community 
as individuals whose hearts are “closed” to their faith.550 The clergy is also prepared to 
utilize its highest censure on secular Coptic Christians who are too vocal with their 
criticism of the Church or the government, threatening to excommunicate those who 
protest the system too vocally.551
The preceding paragraphs demonstrate a system which is much more complex 
than a simple patron-broker-client chain. The model in figure 6.1 simply does not 
demonstrate this level of autonomy which is present in the transactions between the 
clergy and the Coptic community, transactions which were able to maintain themselves 
despite the concerted efforts of President Sadat. What instead appears to develop is a 
vertical hierarchy of independent clientelist relationships in which the ruling party 
accepts the autonomous hegemony of the Church over the Coptic community in return 
for political support and endorsements. The nature of the relationship would therefore be 
more accurately illustrated in Figure 6.2:
547 Sameh Fawzy interview.
548 Ahmed Samih, interview.
549 George Ishak interview.
550 Hasan, 187.
551 Off the record.
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O r th o d o x  C h u rch
T h e S ta te
S e c u la r
C h ristian
A c t iv is ts
C o -o p te d  
C o p tic  C h r istia n s
to lera n ce  o f  a u tonom y
p ro tec tion  from  Is la m is t 
ex tr e m is ts
C lie n te lis t  
R e la tio n sh ip  #  1
C lie n te lis t  
R e la tio n sh ip  #  2
Figure 6.2: Clientelist model demonstrating vertical hierarchy of independent clientelist relationships
As the above model demonstrates, the clientelist relationship between the Coptic 
community and the Egyptian state is actually two independent but symbiotic transactions 
which together maintains the autonomy of the Coptic religious sphere (relationship two) 
while supporting the state (relationship one). Secular Christian activists have their 
activities frustrated by the Orthodox Church and therefore cannot work to help the 
community increase its political involvement. One seemingly glaring omission would be 
the lack of input of Islamic militants in the model. This is due to the argument presented 
in Chapter Four, which maintains that extremists expose a vulnerability within the Coptic 
community which pressure it to maintain the clientelist relationship with the state. The 
inclusion of the Islamists in the model is therefore relegated to state’s moves to 
undermine them.
The lack of Coptic participation in Egyptian government is therefore in some 
sense voluntary. The co-opted community is willing to project an identity of political 
apathy in return for the social programs and opportunities provided by the Church, while 
the clergy itself is allowed to maintain this sphere because of their support for the ruling
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NDP party. Low levels of Christian political involvement are therefore much more 
complicated than a simple case of minority persecution, as many would suggest. It is, in 
many ways, simply another facet of a phenomenon which frustrates all opposition groups 
in non-democratic governments, a phenomenon which is a key reason for 
authoritarianism throughout the Middle East.
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C o n c l u s i o n : L o o k i n g  T o w a r d s  T h e  H o r i z o n
The purpose of this study was to develop a more complex understanding of why 
Egyptian Christians are largely absent from the mainstream Egyptian political sphere. In 
pursuing this question, it has become increasingly clear that the apathetical political role 
of the Coptic Christian community is not simply a case of a persecuted minority as many 
assume. History demonstrates that the Coptic Christians have a legacy of political 
participation within the mainstream Egyptian political sphere during the early 20th 
Century, and today are completely economically integrated with the Muslim majority. 
They have the resources to become involved if they so choose. In many ways, the choice 
to remain isolated is not based on the need to escape persecution but simply another 
manifestation of a systemic clientelist which maintains authoritarian systems throughout 
the Arab region.
Why would this particular relationship develop however? Why would the ruling 
party not attempt to enlist the Christian community in their efforts directly, rather than 
encouraging an indirect clientelist relationship? The key to this requires a step 
backwards to appreciate the wider context of modem Egyptian politics. Both the Coptic 
Christian community and the ruling party under President Mubarak have the same 
primary concern, specifically, the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist 
groups in Egyptian politics. Faced with a possible religious government, the Coptic 
Church has forgone a democracy that could bring militant Islam to power.552 This once 
again raises the question however of why the ruling party does not mobilize Christians 
and give them a prominent place within the party, as was the case with the Wafd party
552 Negad al-Borai, interview.
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during the pre-revolutionary period. The simple answer is that, faced with an Islamist 
opposition, the ruling party cannot often risk nominating Christians for elections. Such a 
strategy would be open to exploitation by Islamist parties whose entire platform revolves 
around embracing Islam as a solution to modem problems. This creates a dynamic by 
which religious character is used in individual races, a factor often pragmatically 
manipulated by all parties.553 By running Muslim candidates, the NDP undermines the 
religious discourse of Islamists at least to some extent.
Of course the motivations for creating such a carefully balanced clientelist system 
go beyond short term electoral considerations. Perhaps the best explanation of this 
relationship’s strength and pervasiveness comes from the Director of the Group for 
Democratic Development, Negad al-Borai. The foundation of the problem in his opinion 
is that no group actually wants to solve it. The “Coptic card” is played by all sides 
without regard for Christian rights. The Church enjoys playing the “victim role” in order 
to demand concessions, while the ruling party considers the Copts a “hostage” to 
negotiate strategic concessions from the United States and Europe in Mubarak’s never 
ending strategy to balance groups off one another. Even secular Copts within the 
international diaspora wish for the current situation to continue to maintain funding and 
support for their NGOs.554
Is everything a simple matter of pragmatic and calculated strategies with no 
concern for positive advancement? While practical considerations are significant, it is 
essential to remember that each actor within the system believes it is making a positive 
contribution for the people of Egypt. President Mubarak and the ruling party believe
553 George Ishak, interview.
554 Negad al-Borai, interview.
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their secular stance and centralized power base provides all Egyptians with a secure 
environment to prosper. The political landscape is simply too tenuous to risk loosing to 
extremists. The Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists believe that the religion of 
Islam is an ideology which promotes freedom, equality and transparency, ideal values for 
anyone within the public trust. They believe their opposition to the ruling party is the key 
to liberal concessions and democratization within the government.555 The Coptic Church, 
for its part, believes that it has the best ability of any Christian group to strengthen and 
maintain the Egyptian Christian identity through religious and social programs. Its 
organizational base and legitimacy allows the clergy to be the perfect contact point with 
the state to ensure Coptic rights. Secular Christians on the other hand argue that true 
strength cannot come from isolating the Coptic community in an autonomous social and 
political sphere. Direct representation in government will ensure that religious and 
political concerns are weighted without bias in the best interests of the community. 
According to Sameh Fawzy, Copts will only reap the rewards of political reform within 
Egypt if they are involved in the process of opening up the system. In his words, “you 
can’t be a good citizen in heaven without being one on Earth”.556
These differences of opinion strike a central reality of Egyptian politics today. A 
country that has so often been told by its leaders that there is only one legitimate course 
towards development and liberty is now arguably fragmenting despite the weight of the 
state’s political restrictions. With such a diversity of peoples, histories and identities, 
Egyptian plurality is beginning to manifest itself through every opportunity that appears. 
To many, this uncertainty is a frightening prospect, as every political group resists those
555 Essam al-Erian, interview.
556 Sameh Fawzy, interview.
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who feel there is a different path into the future. What is clear however, is that clientelist 
relationships, including those between the Coptic Orthodox Church and the ruling party 
are becoming increasingly challenged from all directions within the country. Whether 
they successfully resist, evolve or collapse however is uncertain.
In many ways, this study hopefully represents a first step towards greater 
understanding of an area defined by a distinct literature deficit. It does not however, 
provide a definitive last word on the subject. This study was blessed with access to many 
experts from a variety of perspectives that would answer direct questions with frankness 
and honesty. That said, resources were simply too limited to provide empirical evidence 
to scientifically measure many of the phenomena that were described during interviews. 
In reality, under current conditions within the country, it is difficult to believe any study 
could find direct evidence of an official clientelist agreement between the Church and 
state. First, such a transparency is not a characteristic of clientelist agreements in any 
system. As discussed earlier, these relationships are informal and lack any clear 
institutional evidence. Secondly, the transforming political nature of the Egyptian system 
makes discussion of sensitive topics difficult. Often those who are the most involved in 
policy making will offer researchers the least answers.
Despite these obstacles, future research does have enormous potential to test, 
modify and contribute to the conclusions of this study. Just as this thesis rests upon the 
invaluable research of scholars such as Negad al-Borai, S.S. Hasan, John Watson, B.L. 
Carter, Nelly Van Doom-Harder and Otto F. Meinardus, other studies will hopefully be 
able to use the ideas presented here in order to shed more light onto the Coptic Christians 
of Egypt. One possibility can be for attention to be given to drawing statistical
119
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
relationships between church permits and important political events as well as examining 
the activities and statements of Coptic clergy in response to acts of extremist violence 
during the Sadat and Mubarak period. In fact, the oft-mentioned research deficiency 
represents a practically limitless assortment of options which future studies can explore.
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